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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MARK ANTHONY OTT, Case No. 2004063 8-SC 
Defendant/Appellant. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (i) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from a district court case involving a conviction of a capital felony. 
ISSUES. PRESERVATION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Does Ott's trial's counsel's actual conflict of interest require the reversal of 
Ott's convictions and sentences? 
Because the issue was not raised in the trial, this Court must determine whether an 
actual conflict of interest adversely influenced trial counsel's performance. E.g. Taylor v. 
State. 2007 UT 12, 156 P.3d 739. 
2. Does ineffective assistance of counsel require reversal of Ott's convictions and 
sentences? 
This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for correctness, 
e.g.. State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, ^ 20, 984 P.2d 376, deferring to the trial court's 
findings of fact after a 23B hearing, State v. Wright. 2004 UT App 102, ^  7, 90 P.3d 644. 
This issue was raised in a motion for remand under Utah R. App. P. 23B (e.g. R. 
2166). 
3. Do the exceptional circumstances, plain error and cumulative error doctrines 
require reversal of Ott's convictions and sentences? 
This issue is properly raised for the first time on appeal, and thus, there is no 
standard of review. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION 
In an amended information, the State charged Ott with aggravated murder, 
aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, theft, and violation of a protective order allegedly 
occurring on or about September 1, 2002 (R4-6). Ott was represented by John Caine, 
Aric Cramer and Grant Morrison (R2166: 17). 
Ott entered an Alford plea to the aggravated murder count, and pled guilty to 
attempted aggravated murder, aggravated arson and aggravated assault (Rl 121-1133, 
1135). The State dismissed the remaining charges in this case and in two other cases 
(Rl 135). Ott pled in exchange for the removal of the potential death penalty, with the 
understanding that the jury would be deciding between life with or without parole 
2 
(R1135). 
Following a penalty phase trial, ten of the twelve jurors voted for life without 
parole (Rl 189). The court denied a motion to arrest judgment (Rl 284-1289), and on July 
12, 2004, sentenced Ott to consecutive terms of life without parole, six years to life, five 
years to life, and two to twenty years (R1293-95, 1297). On August 2, 2004, Ott filed a 
pro se notice of appeal, motion to withdraw his pleas and motion for the appointment of 
counsel for appeal (R1299, 1300, 1303). Trial counsel filed a notice of appeal on August 
11, 2004 (Rl322). 
Following a 23B remand, the trial court entered findings (R2136-2151). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF THE CRIMES ESTABLISHED AT TRIAL 
In 1996, Ott married Donna, who had three children, Daniel Gooch (then roughly 
14 years old), Lucy Gooch (then roughly 12), and Sara Gooch (then roughly 9), 
and after they married, Ott and Donna also had two children of their own, William and 
Carissa (R1374: 70; Defense Exhibit 8 p. 14). Ott and his step-children had difficulty 
getting along, and when Donna's oldest son refused to attend school and used and dealt 
illegal drugs out of the house, Ott would kick him out (R1374: 218, 1375:41; Defense 
Exhibit 8 p. 34). Ott and Donna often fought over parenting issues (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 
9). Ott worked sixteen to eighteen hours a day trying to support the family of seven, 
while Donna stayed home and sometimes obtained drugs from her son, whom she allowed 
3 
back into the home (R1376: 233; Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 15, 34). 
Periodically prior to and during the marriage, Ott was medicated with Paxil, 
Wellbutrin and Prozac for depression and anxiety, Viagra to counteract the effects of 
Paxil, and Ephedrine, Guaifenesin and Nasacort for acute sinus problems (Defense 
Exhibit 8 pp. 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 18, 20, 21, 36, 48). He would also sometimes binge drink 
to get to sleep (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 46). He often could not afford the medications he 
needed (R1376:234). A Gulf War veteran with Gulf War Syndrome1 and PTSD,2 he was 
sensitive to the noise made by the children, and would yell, break things, and sometimes 
slap and push his family members (R1374: 75, 2201; Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 2-3, 18, 28, 
31; R. 1377:149). Donna testified that Ott was generally only destructive of property and 
was not violent toward people (Rl375:61). 
Donna obtained a protective order against Ott after one incident in November of 
2000 wherein Ott slapped Donna and Lucy, and after Ott successfully completed 
domestic violence counseling, the marriage improved temporarily (State Exhibit 5; R. 
1377:131, 139, R. 1374: 222-224). On May 31, 2002, Donna obtained a second 
!The United States Department of Defense website explaining its research on the 
syndrome is found at 
http://www.deploymentlink.osd.mil/deploymed/main.jsp?majorDeployment::i:7. 
Ott's PTSD, anxiety attacks, sweating, heart palpitations, high blood pressure, 
nosebleeds and flashbacks were symptoms of this syndrome (R1377: 138). 
Posttraumatic stress disorder is prompted by a person's exposure to extreme 
danger or violence, and is exhibited by the person's subsequent impairment by flashbacks, 
heightened sensitivity and hyper-vigilance, and efforts to avoid reminder experiences. 
See DSMIV-TR, diagnosis 309.81. 
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protective order, which removed Ott from the marital home (State Exhibit 6; Defense 
Exhibit 8 p. 46; R. 1374:226-27, 29). She apparently grabbed Carissa by the arm after 
Carissa would not eat, and this angered Ott because Carissa had just had a cast removed 
(Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 34-35). As a result of the ensuing fight, Ott was charged with 
disorderly conduct (Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 34-35). Donna admitted that she got the 
protective order because Ott was planning to divorce her and take the children the date 
the order issued, and that the protective order gave her significant advantages in the 
divorce: the house, the children, and the possessions (Rl375:42, 62). 
After the protective order issued, the police removed Ott from his home on June 1 
at gunpoint, threatening to "blow his fucking head off." (R1376: 238). He had no 
opportunity to pack, and his parents later retrieved his clothes, but he was never allowed 
back into the home to retrieve anything else (R1376: 239). In June of 2002, after six 
years of marriage, Donna filed for divorce (R1374: 229). Ott continued to exercise 
visitation with his children, and either he or his parents would pick up and drop off the 
children outside the Ott home (R1374: 229-230). 
Before the divorce was final, Donna became romantically involved with Allen 
Lawrence, against the wishes of Ott, who wanted to reconcile with Donna (Rl 3 74: 233). 
After Ott was removed from his home on June 1, 2002, Donna was driving with Allen 
Lawrence and Ott's two children on Antelope Island near the marina where Ott was living 
on his boat (Rl375:45). Donna and Allen testified at trial that when Ott encountered 
5 
them, he became very upset and pursued them in his truck, as if he were trying to run 
them off the road (R1374: 237-38, 1375:105). However, at the preliminary hearing, Allen 
testified that Ott was gesturing and talking as he drove up beside them (R1381: 153). 
From Ott's perspective, Donna was flaunting her relationship with Allen, followed Ott on 
the island, and then cut off Ott (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 35). Ott called the bishop and his 
father, both of whom came to Donna's home to speak with her (R1374: 239). 
On July 18, 2002, Ott called Donna and told her to keep Lawrence away from 
Ott's children until the divorce was final. He called back and said to get the man out of 
the house (State Exhibit 7). Ott called the police the same day to report his misconception 
that Donna was violating the protective order by committing adultery with Lawrence 
(R1374: 139-42). Ott called Donna's parents, and made threatening phone calls to 
Donna, sometimes shooting a gun off, or hanging up (R1374: 230-31). Ott was arrested 
for violating the protective order with his phone calls (R1374: 143). 
In mid-July, Ott and Donna agreed to reconcile and to be faithful to one another, 
but then a neighbor told Ott that Donna and Lawrence were back together (Defense 
Exhibit 8 p. 35). 
On August 6, 2002, Ott encountered Donna and Lawrence at a shopping mall, 
where Ott attacked Lawrence's truck and broke the window, swung at Lawrence and 
threatened him to stay away from Donna, and called Donna an adulteress (R1374 241-
243, 148-155). 
6 
Ott sped from that scene and took two bottles of "mini-thin" (ephedrine) pills, 
crashed his car into a concrete barrier and flipped the car, and then began throwing 
matches inside the car while gas was leaking, in efforts to commit suicide (R1376: 235; 
R. 1377:143, 157; Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 29, 35). 
When Ott was then hospitalized, staff recommended involuntary commitment 
because of his overt suicidal and homicidal intentions (Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 29, 39-40; 
R. 1377:150). Dr. Ogilvie diagnosed Ott with an adjustment disorder with mixed 
emotional behavioral features (heightened and/or disabling emotional and behavioral 
reaction to stressors, see DSMIV-TR diagnosis 309.4), and noted possible additional 
diagnoses of obsessive compulsive disorder (recurring and impairing compulsions or 
obsessions, see DSMIV-TR diagnosis 300.3) and major depression (major depression 
with complicated diagnostic features, see DSMIV-TR diagnoses 296.2x and 296.3x) 
(Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 32-33). A nurse noted his further diagnosis of trichotillomania 
(compulsive pulling out of hair, see DSMIV-TR diagnosis 312.39) (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 
28). Dr. Ogilvie noted that Ott was extremely detailed in his discussion of his problems, 
was unable to comply with repeated confrontations asking him to be succinct, and fell 
asleep periodically while be interviewed (Defense Exhibit 8, pp. 34, 36). Dr. Ogilvie 
increased Ott's Paxil prescription (Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 32-33). Hospital records reflect 
Ott's report that he had had no sleep for fifty-four hours prior to this incident, and had 
lost fifteen pounds in the week and a half prior to the incident (Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 28, 
7 
30). When asked if he would like anything, Ott requested a gun with bullets (Defense 
Exhibit 8 p. 37). 
Rather than being involuntarily committed as recommended, he was taken to the 
Davis County jail the day after the car crash suicide attempt (R1377:147; Defense Exhibit 
8 pp. 39-41). When he heard he was being taken to the jail, he climbed into the ceiling of 
the hospital room and then fell and incurred a head injury and rib injury (R1377:151). 
On August 8, 2002, Ott called Donna and told her that if Lawrence came over 
again, Ott would hunt down Donna and Lawrence like dogs (State Exhibit 8). Otf s father 
listened to a tape of Ott threatening Donna, and Otf s father had Donna remove the 
children from the home because he sensed danger (R13 76:236). Otf s father pleaded with 
the police and with the staff at the hospital after Otf s car crash suicide attempt to get Ott 
a full psychiatric evaluation (R1376:237). He repeatedly warned the police of the 
volatility of the situation (R1377: 20, R. 1374: 235). 
Ott was released from the jail three to four days after his release from the hospital 
to go with his sister to Arizona and seek treatment and get away from the situation in 
Utah (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 46). While in Arizona, Ott sought emergency medical 
assistance from St. Joseph's Hospital for heart irregularities and rib pain, and was sent 
home with a diagnoses of depression, and contusion from his fall from the ceiling at the 
Utah hospital (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 43). On August 12, 2002, in Arizona, Ott again 
sought emergency treatment at St. Joseph's for rib pain and heart irregularities and 
8 
suicidal tendencies (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 44-45). In Arizona, on August 20, 2002, Ott 
went for mental health counseling after having been referred by St. Joseph's, but since he 
was not staying in Arizona permanently, it was determined that it was not necessary or 
appropriate to treat him (Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 45-47). He was diagnosed with 
depressive disorder NOS (not otherwise specified) (depression not meeting more 
specifically diagnostic criteria for identified types of depression, see DSMIV-TR 
diagnosis 311) and alcohol abuse (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 47), and given more Paxil, and 
some Ativan and Temazepam (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 48). 
He had a hearing in Utah on August 27 to answer charges of terroristic threats and 
violating a restraining order (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 46). On August 29, 2002, Ott went 
back to his family doctor in Utah to have his medications checked, and was diagnosed 
with depression and anxiety (Defense Exhibit 8 p. 48; R. 1377: 159-60). The doctor gave 
him two months' worth of Paxil and prescriptions for Paxil and Xanax (Defense Exhibit 8 
p. 48). 
On August 31, 2002, Ott attended a baseball game and party with co-workers and 
behaved in normal fashion (R1374: 163). Ott had a beer or two at the party, but was not 
drunk, and left between midnight and one (R1374: 166-67). Ott went to the Smith's in 
Layton at about 2:13 a.m. on September 1, 2002, and had a normal conversation about 
his camping trip with the clerk while he bought Coleman fuel, soda, bic lighters, a knife, 
water, a charcoal lighter, a steak, and Bayer pain medicine (R1374: 172-75). He asked 
9 
for paper bags so he could light his camp fire (R1374: 177). He seemed normal and was 
not upset (Rl374: 190). 
That night, Donna and Allen Lawrence were asleep in Ott's and Donna's upstairs 
bedroom, Lacey Lawrence was asleep in Carissa's bedroom across the hall with the door 
shut, Sarah Gooch was downstairs in her room, and Lucy Gooch and her friend Hillary 
Gable, a regular sleep over guest, were downstairs in Lucy's room (R1374: 80; R. 1375: 
85). At about 2:30 a.m., Ott went to his home, cut the telephone lines as the dogs were 
barking in the yard, and broke in through the door with knife in hand, asking where Allen 
Lawrence was and if Allen was in Ott's bed (R1375: 18). Sarah ran upstairs with her 
Mace to Donna, and they tried to call for help, but discovered that the phones were not 
working (R1374: 83). When Ott entered the bedroom, Allen Lawrence tried to shut the 
door on Ott and grabbed Ott, who stabbed Lawrence twenty-three times in about twenty 
seconds, causing severe life-threatening injuries to Lawrence (R1375: 95-97, 117; R. 
1381:112, 161). Sarah Gooch jumped on Ott's back and began hitting him on the head 
with a can of Mace, and he stabbed her once in the back, causing serious injuries, and 
then she hit her head on a bedpost and lost consciousness temporarily (R1374: 66-69, 85-
86). At the preliminary hearing, she acknowledged that he might have stabbed her 
accidentally (R1381: 192). Ott followed Lawrence to the front door and stopped stabbing 
him when he broke the knife in Lawrence's back (R1375: 20, 22, 101). Donna told Sarah 
to help Lawrence open the door, and she opened it and they ran out and as far as they 
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could down the street, trailing blood, and then hid behind a fence (R1374: 86, 89; R. 
1375: 119,146). 
Ott stood there by the front door with the broken knife blade dangling (R1375:22). 
He cut his neck in front of Donna (R1381: 141) or put the knife to his neck where there 
appeared to be a wound and said to Donna, "Look what you've made me do. Are you 
happy now?" (Rl375:22, 55). He embraced her from behind and she tried to get away, as 
Lucy came in and screamed and ran back downstairs and hid in the bathroom behind the 
water heater with Hillary and tried to make the phone work (Rl375:23, 82). Ott left 
Donna and went outside through the kitchen, trailing his own blood into the garage 
(R1375:23, 147). Donna went to use the bathroom and Ott came into the bedroom and 
was pouring gasoline on the bed and said she thought he would douse her with fuel as he 
looked at her (Rl375:24). She snuck down the hall and he was in the livingroom lighting 
the love seat on fire, and the couch was already on fire (Rl375:25). She asked what he 
was doing, and then went and found Lucy and Hillary in the basement and got them 
upstairs and told them to get out because Ott had set the house on fire (Rl375:25-26). 
They went out through the back door and she told Lucy to call the police from a 
neighbor's (R1375:26). Ott did not stop Donna or Lucy or Hillary from leaving 
(Rl375:57). Donna testified that Ott was present when Allen Lawrence left, but she 
vacillated about whether he saw her leave with Lucy and Hillary (R1375: 59). 
Donna counted heads and forgot that Lacey Lawrence was inside (Rl375:57). She 
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could not go back inside although she had an inkling that she should, and then went 
calling for Sarah (Rl375:26). She found Sarah and Allen Lawrence behind a fence four 
houses away, and watched Ott run to his brother's truck, and drive away in Donna's 
Explorer (R1375:28-29). 
Donna realized that Lacey was inside the house and ran and told the police, but 
they would not let her or Sarah go in because the fire was raging (Rl375:29-30). Allen 
Lawrence knew that Lacey was in the house but he was too injured to get up and save her, 
and lay on the ground helpless and hoping that someone else could (R1375: 121-122). 
Firefighters went in and found her dressed in a sweatshirt, lying on the bed on top of the 
covers inside the bedroom with the door closed, but were not able to revive her (R1374: 
114, 117; R. 1376: 75, 111). The medical examiner opined that Lacey died from carbon 
monoxide poisoning and that there is no way to tell if she suffered (R1376: 114-115). 
Ott drove Donna's Explorer to Idaho, where he was arrested and treated for a 
serious cut to his neck, and for cuts to both of his wrists (R1375: 162). The police found 
Allen Lawrence's wallet in the Explorer (R1378: 108). Lawrence had left it in the pocket 
of his shorts, on Ott's bedroom floor (R1378: 111). 
The State conceded from the outset of the case that Ott did not know that Lacey 
was in the house (R1381: 11). 
The audio tape of the first extradition hearing records Ott crying when he was 
informed that someone was killed. The audio tape of the second extradition hearing 
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records Ott sobbing when he learned that Lawrence's six-year-old daughter was killed in 
the fire. From comments made by the judge and the judge's tone of voice, it appears that 
Ott was not able to follow and not tracking mentally during the hearings.3 Ott repeatedly 
tried to commit suicide in Idaho before his extradition, and in the Utah facilities where he 
was held prior to trial (R1377:153-61; Defense Exhibit 8 p. 49). 
On the way back from Idaho, after being informed of his Miranda rights and that 
his family had retained a lawyer, Ott asked how Allen was doing, said that he could recall 
bits and pieces because the whole thing was a blur, that he was hearing voices that Allen 
was in his home and that he needed to get him out, to take the Layton exit, and that he 
went to a Smith's before going to his home (R1382: 281). He said he told Donna to get 
everyone out of the house, but could not recall starting the fire (R1382: 283). He agreed 
that he wanted to get Allen and burn down the house, which he paid for (R1382: 283). 
These crimes were a radical departure from his pre-existing law abiding life, 
wherein his criminal history consisted of a speeding ticket (Rl 376:243). Donna testified 
that Ott was generally only destructive of property and was not violent toward people, and 
that his actions and violence during the crimes were unexpected (Rl375:61). 
A jury trial heard the penalty phase, and entered a verdict of life without parole on 
April 2, 2004 (Rl 153). 
3Trial counsel played the tapes for the jury but did not put them in evidence 
(R1377:6-7). 
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OTHER PENALTY PHASE FACTS 
Other than presenting the facts of the crimes and history discussed above, the 
prosecution presented records of several incidents of Ott's suicide attempts, threats, 
grievances, misbehavior and mental health monitoring and treatment in jail and prison 
(R1375: 172-209, R. 1376: 9-41, 77-95; State Exhibits 27a, 27b, 28, 29 and 30; R. 1378: 
112). In its rebuttal, the prosecution presented a witness who was friends with Ott, who 
testified that Ott repeatedly voiced the intention to kill Allen Lawrence (R1378: 110). 
The remainder of the State's penalty phase case was victim impact evidence. 
The prosecution presented a great deal of speculative evidence concerning Lacey's 
potential suffering, although Dr. Frikke, the Medical Examiner, testified that there was no 
way to tell if she suffered (R1376:l 14-115). Dr. Frikke speculated that Lacey may have 
been getting dressed to try and escape, because she was wearing a sweatshirt when she 
was found lying on the bed (R1376: 111). She suggested that Lacey might have had a 
headache from carbon monoxide and testified that carbon monoxide suffocates the body 
and that the soot Lacey inhaled is an irritant (R1376: 1115, 117). A firefighter testified 
that he could not imagine anything more painful than inhaling super heated gases but then 
conceded that carbon monoxide often renders people unconscious (R1374: 136-138). The 
State's burn pattern expert testified that Lacey was on top of the covers and he speculated 
that she was lying on the bed listening to what was happening in the master bedroom, 
although he did not really know (R1376:75, 76). Sarah Gooch testified that she tried to 
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charge back into the fire to save Lacey because she was so little and sweet and could not 
do it herself, and must have been so scared (R1374: 94). The medical examiner also 
described Lacey's autopsy in detail (R1376:103-117). 
The prosecution had numerous witnesses testify about their love for Lacey, the 
impact of Ott's crimes, and why he should be sentenced to life without parole. 
Donna Ott testified about the trauma she and her children suffered from Ott's 
crimes (R1375: 31-34). The house was burned so severely that they had to rent for five 
months (R1375:31-32). Sarah was in recovery but could not tolerate therapy (R1375:31, 
33), and Lucy was in therapy and went to live with her father because Donna could not 
take care of her family (R1375:32-33). It was all Donna could do to care for William and 
Carissa (R1375:33). Sarah was in the hospital for eight days and then took at least a 
month to recover physically (Rl375:33). Both girls have sleep difficulty and Sarah was 
hardened by the experience (Rl 375:34). Lacey took care of Carissa, who was three, and 
they were like sisters, and William was in love with Lacey (Rl375:7). 
Donna opined on punishment, predicting that Ott could not change and would 
come looking for them if paroled (R1375: 34-35). 
Sarah Gooch had a single stab wound that perforated her colon in two places 
(R1375: 139-40). She testified regarding her physical injuries and suffering, her medical 
treatment, and the emotional pain and difficulties she suffered as a result of Ott's crimes 
(R1374: 90-93). The crimes stopped her from sleeping, and everyone wanting to know 
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about them made her life harder - she attributed her not graduating high school to Ott and 
people's interest in the crimes (R1374: 69, 92-93). She showed the jurors her scars, and 
her medical records were all admitted (R1374: 91-92, 139-40; State Exhibits 10 and 38). 
Sarah told the jurors that she was terrified with Ott locked up, let alone free, and 
feared that he would be more angry if released after being imprisoned (R1374: 83). 
Lucy Gooch testified that she could not sleep without nightmares or go to school, 
that her friendship with Hillary was ruined, and that she went to live with her father in 
Hooper to escape memories of Ott (R1376: 124-26). 
She testified that Ott would come kill them if he were paroled (R1376: 149). 
Hillary Gable testified about the trauma she suffered from Ott's crimes (R1375: 
86-87). They made her feel terrified of everything (Rl 375:86). She went to counseling 
and had nightmares and could not sleep (Rl375:87). She does not sleep at friends' 
houses and her father checks the doors and does not sleep as a result of the crimes 
(R1375:87). 
Allen Lawrence testified that his injuries were nearly fatal, and he felt that Ott did 
everything he could to kill him (Rl375:94). He had twenty-three stab wounds involving 
his lungs, stomach, intestines, gall bladder, wrists, tendons in thumbs and fingers, hand, 
arm and head (Rl 375:95, 97). He lost so much blood that one of his optic nerves began 
to die and his vision is permanently damaged and he feels like there is something in his 
eye and he has a blind spot (R1375:95). He was somewhat conscious during emergency 
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treatment, but lost consciousness for a couple of days and lost all track of time 
(Rl375:98). He had multiple surgeries to put his back, arms and wrists together, and to 
scrape out his lungs after the blood settled in them (Rl375:99). His medical records were 
all admitted (R1375: 133-134; State's Exhibit 13 and 14). 
He knew Lacey was in the burning house but could not do anything but try and 
hold himself together (Rl 375:120). He could not see or get up, and could not talk 
because he was gurgling with blood (R1375:121). He heard that Lacey was in there when 
Donna screamed it, and it was horrible for him not to be able to move to save his daughter 
and to just lie there hoping someone could (Rl 375:121-22). 
A police officer put a coat or something over him, because he was only wearing 
briefs and was bleeding, and the officer held him tight and tried to sooth him 
(R1375:122). The paramedics put him on a stretcher and wheeled him onto the football 
field for Lifeflight (R1375:122). He could tell from the lights when they got to the 
hospital, and he overheard one med tech ask if they got the little girl out, and the other 
one answered no (Rl375:123). That was the last thing he recalled hearing for a few days 
(Rl375:123). He was in a morphine nightmare with the knowledge that he had been cut 
to ribbons and that his daughter was dead (Rl375:123). 
For about a year after that, he wished he was dead (Rl375:124). He would trade 
places with Lacey in a heartbeat (Rl375:125). Everyone is sad, but his daughter Amber 
had a nervous breakdown and was in shock for months (R 1375:125). She was a junior in 
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high school at the time and never went back because of the stigmatizing effect of the 
crimes (Rl 375:125). He testified about how wonderful Lacey was and how much he 
loved being her father (Rl375:128-31). He characterized Ott as a psychopath and a 
terrorist (R1375: 126-27). 
Amber Lawrence, sixteen years old at the time of the crimes, testified that Lacey 
was her only little sister, whom she had always wanted (R1376: 154, 158). Amber was 
supposed to be there at Ott's on the night of Lacey's death (R1376:154). Her father was 
so bloated and injured she could not recognize him and thought he would die 
(Rl376:154-55). She used to be an honor student, but dropped out and was trying to 
graduate in night school, but could not concentrate and had begun to stutter (Rl376:157). 
She voiced her opinion that Ott would not change (R1376: 160). 
Lacey Lawrence's mother, Terry Cook, testified about how she had five 
miscarriages before her high risk pregnancy with Lacey, who was such a wonderful 
blessing in everyone's lives (R1376: 162-65). She learned of Lacey's death at 10:30 in 
the morning, after trying to reach Allen by cell phone since 6:30, because she and Lacey 
were going to go pick out a kitten together (R13 76:166). A police officer contacted her 
and asked her to go to her parents', and her friend led her to believe something had 
happened to them, and drove her there (Rl 376:166-67). When she learned of Lacey's 
death, she was devastated (R1376:167). She had been to counseling but it did not help 
(Rl376:167). She could not sleep or work or go to school or socialize or have 
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relationships, and had just started medication (R1376:168). Her life was destroyed 
(Rl376:169). Her parents watched Lacey and their friends and everyone was hurting 
(Rl376:170). She testified that she hoped Ott never got parole because he did not 
deserve it (R1376:171). 
The prosecution closed its case with an extremely emotionally moving video 
presentation of Lacey's life entitled "Meet Lacey Lawrence," a six minute video set to 
"You'll Always Be a Part of Me," sung by Billy Joel and "It's a Wonderful World," sung 
by Louis Armstrong. The video beautifully depicts Lacey as a baby being held, fed and 
bathed by her loved ones, crawling, rolling over, walking, eating birthday cake, attending 
parties, celebrating Christmas, singing "Happy Birthday" and blowing out candles, 
smiling, playing, riding a horse with her father, and dancing. It also depicts what appears 
to be her artwork and writing, including her drawing of a little girl in bed, and her writing 
of, "I love you Mommy." It ends with the dates of her birth and death, showing that she 
died two weeks before her seventh birthday (R1376:172).4 
The defense case established that Ott grew up in very difficult circumstances. His 
father was an alcoholic who was in the military, moved the family home many times, was 
often gone from the home the majority of the time, and openly had an affair with a maid 
(R1376: 224-228). Ott's father was violent and mean to the children, and his mother, 
who was left to raise five children bom in an eight year span, who spoke no English and 
4The videotape was played for the jury but withheld from evidence (Rl 377:6-7). 
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who had very little money, was violent and mean to the children and was repeatedly 
hospitalized for nervous breakdowns (R1376: 217-228; R. 1377:40, 62-70). When one of 
the children had a bed-wetting problem, Ott's mother beat her genitals with a wooden 
spoon (R1377:64). She threw another against a wall and split her head open and then 
kicked her for bleeding on the floor (R1377:65). Other children had to rescue this child, 
but she was not taken to the hospital (Rl377:65). Ott's father grabbed this child by the 
hair and beat her, and she attempted suicide (R1377:65-66). Ott's mother kicked her in 
the stomach when she was eight months pregnant (R 1377:70). Ott's father was prone to 
screaming fits and berated the children (R1377: 83). Ott's parents fought constantly, and 
he saw his father hit his mother (R1376: 227-228, R. 1377: 41).5 
Ott was in special education, and had breasts until they were removed with lipo-
suction (R1376:229). 
He joined the Army at age 18, but was discharged honorably, but for not fitting in 
(R1376:231-32). Ott served in Operation Desert Storm Shield in 1991 (R1377:l 19), and 
suffered from PTSD and Gulf War Syndrome thereafter (Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 2-3, 18, 
28, 31). He was awarded in 1988 and 1994 for his National Guard service (R1377:120-
121).6 Ott had a good reputation when he was in the service in 1991 and went to rebuild 
5Ott's mother collapsed in court during the presentation of the defense case 
(R1377: 209, 1378: 3). 
6The defense played a videotape of Ott being interviewed before being shipped 
out, but did not put the tape in evidence (R1377: 7). 
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facilities in the Virgin Islands (R1377:172). He also donated electrical work over the 
years (Rl377:173). 
Witnesses attested to his love for own his children,7 his efforts to raise Donna's 
children despite their disrespect, his efforts to support his family, and his often not being 
able to afford his medications (R1376: 206, 233-234; R. 1378: 76). 
The defense presented evidence that when inmates get life without parole, 
Corrections generally does not use rehabilitative resources on them or let them work 
(R1377:93). Most of them spend an hour out of their cell every other day (R1377:94). 
In the penalty phase, harmful evidence came in through the defense witnesses, 
including testimony that Ott sometimes did not take his medication (R1376: 184), 
sometimes did not take his medication because he was embarrassed (R1377: 202), always 
had a quick temper which was worse after his service in the military (R1376: 178), was 
always angry (R1376: 206, 208), and left the military because he could not handle it 
(R1376: 193). Records presented through the defense showed that Ott still harbored 
uncontrollable anger and violent tendencies toward Donna in September of 2003 (R1378: 
23), that he is sociopathic and takes no responsibility (R1378:26), that he uses anger as a 
tool (R1378:26), and that he failed to take his medications in prison on multiple occasions 
(R1378:28-32). Defense records reflect a jailer's report that on one occasion, he told a 
7The defense played a videotape of Ott fishing with his children, but did not put the 
tape in evidence (R1376: 248; R. 1377: 7). 
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jailer, "Children pay for their parents' crimes," as it says in the Bible (Rl378:34). 
Ott's brother testified that the family members can get "mad as heck" and "hold a 
grudge forever." (R1377: 49). One of the defense lawyers revisited this testimony and the 
brother testified that he did not think Ott would hold a grudge against Allen Lawrence 
because "sometimes it's hard to remember what you did the week before." (R1377: 56). 
The lawyer then noted that this brother once put Ott in the hospital after a fight and asked 
him if Ott held a life- long grudge against him (R1377: 51, 56). He answered, "No. But I 
think he got me back." (R1377: 56). The lawyer inquired further as to how Ott did that, 
and he responded, "I took a brick to the forehead." (R1377: 56). This same brother 
testified that Ott's father encouraged Ott to violate the protective order, and agitated Ott, 
because Ott's father was worried that Donna would get everything in the divorce 
(R1377:46). 
A defense witness testified that the board of pardons has discretion to release 
people before their minimum term in special circumstances, that the average five to life 
sentence is fourteen years, and that they can release someone after one day (R1377:89-
90). 
Ott exercised his right to allocution, first acknowledging that he tried to kill Allen 
Lawrence, stabbed his step-daughter, Sarah, and set his house on fire (Rl 378:134). He 
did not know and had no idea that Lacey was in the home at that time, but took 
responsibility for causing her death, and mourned for her (R1378:134). He apologized to 
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Lacey's mother and, particularly after having seen the video, "Meet Lacey Lawrence," 
and after not being able to see his own children, had a better understanding of her grief 
(R1378:134-35). He apologized for his actions and asked for the chance to be paroled 
someday (R1378:35). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The performance of Ott's lead trial counsel was infected by his actual conflict of 
interest. At the same time he was representing Ott, John Caine was not only friends with 
the prosecutor, Melvin Wilson, but also, was acting as his attorney and co-counsel in a 
civil suit they filed on behalf of the prosecutor's wife . 
The record demonstrates numerous instances wherein trial counsel's performance 
was adversely influenced by the conflict, and was objectively deficient. Trial counsel 
failed to investigate the underlying facts and mitigation evidence, mishandled Ott's 
competency and mental health issues, failed to investigate and present evidence of Ott's 
bipolar disorder, PTSD and brain damage, failed to object to anonymous jury proceedings 
and to highly prejudicial victim impact evidence, inexplicably agreed to withhold key 
evidence from the record despite its admission for the jurors during the penally phase, and 
presented a tardy and inadequate challenge to the life without parole statute. 
Because lead trial counsel was acting with an actual conflict of interest, it is not 
necessary for Ott to show traditional prejudice. Assuming it were necessary to do so, the 
record before the Court amply demonstrates a reasonable probability of several different 
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results more favorable to Ott than actually occurred. 
Whether the Court assesses this record in light of the actual conflict of interest, or 
in light of the ineffective assistance of counsel, or exceptional circumstances, plain error 
or cumulative error doctrines, the proper course of action is to reverse Ott's convictions 
and sentences. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. OTT'S LEAD COUNSEL'S ACTUAL CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST, AND GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSION INTO 
AND INTERFERENCE WITH OTT'S COUNSEL, 
REQUIRE THE REVERSAL OF OTT'S CONVICTIONS 
AND SENTENCES. 
A. BACKGROUND FACTS 
Ott's Lead trial counsel, John Caine, had a longstanding and close friendship with 
the prosecutor, Melvin Wilson, and the prosecutor's wife, Susan Wilson, spanning more 
than thirty years (R2166:30-31, 74). After Susan Wilson was terminated from her job and 
decided to sue her employer, Melvin Wilson asked Caine to represent her in the suit, and 
they reached a contingency fee agreement, wherein Caine would receive roughly twenty-
five percent of anything he recovered on the Wilson family's behalf (R2166:31-32, 75). 
The civil suit was pending well before and nearly throughout Ott's prosecution. 
Melvin Wilson or Caine drafted and filed a notice of claim on Susan Wilson's behalf 
December 2, 2002 (R2166:32). Caine was appointed to represent Ott on October 29, 
2003 (R. 944-45). Melvin Wilson and Caine drafted and filed Susan Wilson's civil 
24 
complaint seeking $50,000 in damages for the Wilson family on January 16, 2004 
(R2166:32, 76). Caine pled Ott guilty on March 16, 2004 (R. 1121-1133, 1135). The 
next day, on March 17, 2004, the same day Ott's jury selection began, Caine filed a 
memorandum opposing dismissal of Wilson's suit (R2166:33). Ott's penalty phase ended 
in the jury's verdict of life without parole on April 1, 2004 (R. 1189). The Wilsons' civil 
suit was pending until April 28, 2004, when it was dismissed (R2166:33). 
Because Wilson sought out Caine's representation and stood to gain from the suit, 
he is properly viewed as Caine's client in that suit.8 Because they were working on the 
suit together (R2155:32, 76), they are also properly viewed as co-counsel. 
There is no evidence that anyone informed Ott, the trial court, or Caine's co-
counsel for Ott of the lawsuit or friendship (R2166:33, 34, 137, 176). Mr. Wilson served 
on the Indigent Defense Trust Fund Board at the time of Caine's appointment, and made 
no mentioln to the Board of Caine's relationship with him and his wife or of the lawsuit 
during the! Board's discussions concerning the Caine's appointment (R2166:76-77). 
While Wilson testified that he did not seek Caine's appointment and abstained from 
voting on |it (R2166: 76-78, 83; State's Exhibit 4, page 2), Wilson had discussions with 
Board mefribers outside Board meetings regarding the Board's hiring of Caine, and did 
8
 Ske, e.g.. Ut.R.Evid. 504(a)(1) ("... As used in this rule: A 'client' is a person, 
including a public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, 
either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who 
consults a| lawyer with a view to obtaining professional legal services."). 
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not inform Board members regarding the lawsuit (R2166:79). The contract between 
Caine and the Board, which Wilson helped draft and Caine signed, specifically avers that 
Caine had no conflict of interest in representing Ott (R2166:33-34, 80). 
Caine conceded that Wilson's interests were adverse to Ott's by virtue of Wilson's 
initially seeking Ott's execution, and then seeking his imprisonment for the remainder of 
Ott's life without parole (R2166:30). Caine testified that his representing Susan Wilson 
did not influence his representation of Ott, that Melvin Wilson had nothing to do with 
Caine's appointment to represent Ott, and that Caine's friendship with Wilson may have 
benefitted Ott in the agreements that Caine and Wilson reached (R2166:62). 
In contrast, Wilson testified that as a prosecutor, he does not do his friends favors, 
particularly in prosecuting capital cases (R2166:88). Wilson testified that Caine 
discussed defense strategy with Wilson in reaching their agreement regarding Dr. Egli's 
testimony (R2166:89). 
It was only a few weeks prior to the 23B hearing that the Government informed 
defense counsel and the trial court of the facts underlying the conflict of interest claims 
(R2148). Caine and Wilson did not respond to defense efforts to interview them prior to 
the evidentiary hearing (R2166:41-42, 80, R2062). 
B. RELEVANT LAW 
A lawyer is viewed as acting with an actual conflict when the lawyer takes a 
position which is directly contrary to the client's interests or when the lawyer is required 
26 
to make choices to the detriment of the client. Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, If 124, 2007 
WL 188572. Assessing whether a conflict has adversely influenced a criminal defendant 
involves consideration of whether a different lawyer would have handled the defendant's 
case differently than the actual lawyer did, and whether the actual lawyer's performance 
was justified by a tactical reason, rather than the conflict. State v. Lovell 1999 UT 40, ^  
24, 984 P.2d 382. Other relevant factors include whether the lawyer informed the client 
of the relationship between himself and the prosecutor, whether the client acquiesced to 
continuing representation because he believed he would benefit therefrom, whether the 
prosecutor had access to defense information as a result of the relationship, whether there 
is evidence of improper conduct by the defense lawyer or prosecutor, and whether it was 
possible for the defense lawyer to gain anything by acting against the defendant's 
interests. See id. at Tf 25. 
Additionally, the Court may refer to the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct in 
assessing conflict of interest. State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rule 1.7 defines conflict of interest for purposes of legal representation. It states: 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client 
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if: 
(a)(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client; or 
(a)(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more 
clients will be materially limited by the lawyers responsibilities to another 
client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the 
lawyer. 
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The Rule details circumstances in which conflicts may be waived, stating: 
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under 
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: 
(b)(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide 
competent and diligent representation to each affected client; 
(b)(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(b)(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one 
client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation 
or other proceeding before a tribunal; and 
(b)(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. 
In assessing conflicts of interest, it is also appropriate for the Court to consider 
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d), which forbids lawyers to practice in a manner which 
prejudices the administration of justice. See Johnson, supra, 823 P.2d at 489-90. In this 
area, the Court may consider whether a lawyer's service on a case impugned the integrity 
of the verdict, whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a specific impropriety 
occurred as a result of counsel's representation, and whether public confidence in the 
legal system is at risk as a result of the representation. See id. 
Prosecutors are ministers of justice, who are to act impartially with an eye toward 
fairness, and who have a duty to bring relevant information to the court's attention. State 
v. Casey, 2002 UT 29, ffif 32 and 37, 44 P.3d 756. The ABA Guidelines for Appointment 
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases required Caine to facilitate 
the work of successor counsel. See Guideline 10.13.9 
9
 The United States Supreme Court recognizes the guidelines as setting the 
standards of objectively reasonable performance for capital trial counsel. See Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (characterizing these guidelines as "standards to which 
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The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated by governmental intrusion into 
the attorney-client relationship if the intrusion was prejudicial. See, e.g., Weatherford v. 
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 (1977). Four factors guide the prejudice inquiry when 
government intrusion occurs: whether governmental intrusion was purposeful, whether 
evidence offered at trial resulted directly or indirectly from that intrusion, whether the 
intrusion resulted in the prosecutor's being privy to the defense strategy or preparation, 
and whether the defendant was substantially harmed in any other way by the intrusion, 
id. at 554. 
Prejudice is presumed when the defense lawyer suffers from an actual conflict of 
interest. See, Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 360 (1980V This presumption of 
prejudice applies when the defense lawyer actively represented conflicting interests and 
when the conflict adversely impacted specific elements of the lawyer's performance. Id. 
at 348. The presumption applies because defense lawyers owe a basic duty of loyalty to 
their clients, and the influences of their conflict of interest are frequently difficult to 
measure. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 692 (1984). "If an attorney's loyalty is 
compromised ... because he is influenced by a conflict in loyalties to ... third parties, or 
the government, the law cannot tolerate the risk that the attorney will fail to subject the 
we long have referred as 'guides to determining what is reasonable.'"). 




prosecution's case to the kind of adversarial challenge necessary to ensure that the 
accused receives the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment." State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1994). The duty of loyalty is so 
"direct and fundamental" that our state and federal courts are unwilling to attempt to 
calculate prejudice. Id. at 361. 
Prejudice is also presumed when there is state interference with the right to 
counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. This is so because the Government has the ability 
to prevent those impairments of the right to counsel for which it is responsible. Id. 
In other cases wherein standard prejudice inquiry is not possible or is ill-advised, 
prejudice is presumed. See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857, 859 (Utah 
1992)(prejudice presumed when defense counsel acted as part-time prosecutor). 
C. APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FACTS 
Under the relevant law discussed above, particularly where the prosecutor and Ott 
had adverse interests (R2166:30), and where Caine and Wilson both stood to gain 
financially from the Wilsons9 civil suit (R2166:31-32, 75), which was ongoing at the time 
ofOtt's prosecution (R2166:32-33, 76, R. 944-45, 1121-1133, 1135, 1189), Caine had an 
actual conflict of interest as a result of his and the prosecutor's concurrent representation 
of Susan Wilson and Caine's representation of Ott in this capital case. See Utah R. Prof. 
Conduct 1.7, supra. 
In its 23B findings, the trial court made three key negative finding, the emphasized 
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portion of which Point II of this brief demonstrates to be clearly erroneous. The findings 
state, in relevant part: 
48. Defendant has not demonstrated that Caine's representation of 
Susan Wilson in an unrelated civil case required Caine to make any 
choices that would advance the interests of himself or others over the 
interests of Defendant in this case. 
49. Nothing in the record or in the testimony suggests that 
Caine ever acted adversely to Defendant's interests in favor of 
Wilson's interests. The Court accepts as true Caine's and 
Wilson's testimony that Caine's representation of Susan did 
not in any way influence Caine's representation of Defendant. 
(T. 84, 88-90). 
51. There was no actual conflict of interest between Caine and 
Defendant that adversely affected counsel's performance. 
(R2150)(Emphasis added). 
Appellants challenging the factual findings of trial courts must normally marshal 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences which support the findings. See, e.g., 
Ut.RApp.P. 24(a)(9). Because they are phrased in the negative, it is not possible to 
marshal evidence in support of the emphasized portions of Findings 48, 49 and 51. 
As is detailed in Point II of this brief, Caine repeatedly took positions which were 
directly contrary to Ott's best interest and made choices to Ott's detriment, demonstrating 
an actual conflict of interest. See Taylor v. State. 2007 UT 12, ^ 124, 2007 WL 188572, 
supra. Trial counsel's failure to investigate the underlying facts and mitigation evidence, 
mishandling of Ott's competency and mental health issues, failure to investigate and 
present evidence of Ott's bipolar disorder, PTSD and brain damage, failure to object to 
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anonymous jury proceedings and to highly prejudicial victim impact evidence, 
inexplicable agreement to exclude key evidence from the record despite its admission for 
the jurors during the penalty phase, and presentation of a tardy and inadequate challenge 
to the life without parole statute are concrete examples of Caine's making choices and 
taking positions that were contrary to Ott's best interests. See Point II, infra. A 
competent lawyer would not have taken the positions Caine took, and would not have 
made the choices Caine made, and there is no valid tactical reason to justify Caine's 
actions, omissions and choices, discussed below. See State v. Lovell 1999 UT 40, % 24, 
984 P.2d 382, supra. 
The facts that neither Caine nor the prosecutor informed Ott, co-counsel, the trial 
court, or the Indigent Defense Trust Fund Board of the lawsuit or relationship between 
Caine and the prosecutor (R2166:33, 34, 76-77, 137, 176), and that Caine and the 
prosecutor were discussing defense strategy and negotiated away Ott's fundamental 
constitutional rights to present a complete defense (R2166: 89), confirm that an actual 
conflict of interest infected the proceedings in Ott's case. See id. at f 25. The fact that 
Ott was never informed of the concurrent representation or given an opportunity to waive 
the conflict (R2166:33, 34, 137, 176) confirms the impropriety of the arrangement, which 
violated the rules of professional conduct on conflict of interest and practicing in a 
manner which prejudices the administration of justice. See Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct 1.7 and 8.4(d), supra. The fact that neither Caine nor Wilson were definite 
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about the amount Caine would receive under the contingency fee agreement (R2166:31-
32, 75) gives rise to the possibility that the amount Caine would receive in the civil suit 
was not settled, but could be influenced by unspecified factors, including his performance 
in this case. See Lovell, supra. 
The fact that Caine and Wilson discussed defense strategy and reached an 
agreement, whereby Ott's mitigation evidence was significantly curtailed (R2166: 89), 
demonstrates prejudicial governmental intrusion into and interference with Ott's right to 
counsel. Particularly given that the prosecutor was not just aware of, but was a party to 
the conflict of interest, and that the prosecutor did not disclose the conflict to the trial 
court, to the Indigent Defense Trust Fund Board, to Mr. Ott, or to co-counsel for Ott 
(R2166:33, 34, 76-77, 137, 176), this case is fundamentally undermined by governmental 
intrusion into Ott's attorney-client relationship, see Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558, and the 
State's interference with Ott's right to counsel, see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. 
Caine's and Wilson's failure to timely inform the court and defense counsel 
regarding this issue, and failure to respond to the defense efforts to interview them prior 
to the evidentiary hearing (R2166:41-42, 80; R2062) so that counsel for Ott could be 
prepared to present the relevant information to the court, run counter to Wilson's duty as 
a prosecutor to act as a minister of justice, see Casey, supra, and to Caine's duty to 
facilitate the work of successor counsel, see Guideline 10.13, supra. Their conduct in this 
regard increased the difficulty of proving what occurred between the two of them and 
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establishing prejudice, and weighs in favor of presuming prejudice. See State v. Brown, 
supra. 
II. OTT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL. 
An ineffectiveness claim has two components. First, Ott must identify the specific 
acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 (1984). Second, Ott must show "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Id. at 687. In proving deficient performance, Ott 
must show that "on the basis of the law in effect at the time of trial, his or her trial 
counsel's performance was deficient."10 Ott must rebut the strong presumption that the 
lawyer's actions under the circumstances then prevailing might be viewed as reasonable 
trial strategy, by convincing the Court that there was no conceivable reasonable trial 
strategy to justify the actions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; State v. Clark, 2004 UT 
25, Tf 6, 89 P.3d 162. However, even actual tactical decisions reflected in the record are 
still reviewed for reasonableness. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1989). 
Because this is a capital case, and because the death penalty was in play during 
pretrial preparation and up until Ott pled at the outset of trial, the ABA Guidelines guide 
the analysis of whether counsel's performance in pretrial preparation and in pre-plea 
State v.Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1228 (Utah 1993). 
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proceedings was objectively deficient. See Strickland, supra, (requiring assessment of 
counsel's performance at the time of that performance, rather than in hindsight). 
Our adversarial system depends on trial lawyers to investigate their cases, and to 
abstain from investigating only when there is a reasonable basis for doing so. Nguyen v. 
Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1347 (10th Cir. 1997). It can never be a valid strategic or 
tactical decision to abstain from investigating the facts underlying a case and potential 
defense witnesses. State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990). The duty to 
investigate is strictly observed in capital cases. Nguyen, supra. Trial lawyers are duty 
bound to make reasonable investigations into the facts and the law, and cannot make valid 
strategic decisions absent reasonably necessary and thorough investigation of the facts 
and the law. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690. Counsel may be responsive 
to a defendant's wishes in selecting defenses once investigation is complete, but have an 
independent duty to investigate mitigation in capital cases. E.g. Nguyen, supra. 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e ^ , State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at If 10, 67 P.3d 
1005. When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes 
objectively deficient performance, which will not be excused by the courts with 
hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzsky. 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) 
(trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the 
client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not conceivably have 
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been valid trial strategy). Appointed lawyers in capital cases must always assert their 
client's legal claims and rights. See ABA Guideline 10.8. 
Capital lawyers with mentally ill clients have a greater duty to protect their clients' 
rights and to fully investigate their competency, because the clients' own judgment is 
impaired. See e.g.. Williamson v. Ward, 110F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1997). When 
lawyers representing potentially incompetent clients rely on inadequate evaluations and 
fail to pursue current and complete competency evaluations, this constitutes objectively 
deficient performance. See id. at 1513-19. 
The prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel doctrine generally 
requires proof of a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the 
objectively deficient performance. See, e.g.. State v. LovelL 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 
1988). If there is a reasonable probability that the client was tried while incompetent, the 
objectively deficient performance of the lawyer is viewed as prejudicial. See Williamson, 
110 F.3d at 1520. A defendant seeking to vitiate a guilty plea on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that 
he would have gone to trial absent the deficient performance. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 
52, 29 (1985). Ten of the jurors, the minimum number required by statute, voted for life 
without parole (R. 1189). To show prejudice in a capital penalty phase, Ott must show 
that a reasonable probability that at least one of these jurors would have voted differently. 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (reversing capital sentence for ineffective 
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assistance after concluding that if the defense case had been handled competently, there 
was "a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different 
balance."). 
Ott now details numerous instances in which trial counsel performed in an 
objectively deficient manner, and wherein Caine made choices and took positions to Ott's 
detriment, which favored the position of Caine's other client and co-counsel, the 
prosecutor. 
A. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE UNDERLYING FACTS 
AND MITIGATION 
The ABA standards and governing case law are uniform in recognizing that 
investigation is key to all criminal defense work, and that there can be no valid strategic 
reason to abstain from investigating the unknown (R2166:174-75). See, e.g., ABA 
Guideline 1.7 and commentary. The guidelines call for each capital defense team to 
consist of at least two lawyers, one investigator and one mitigation expert. Id., Guideline 
4.1. Ott's defense team did not ever hire a fact investigator to investigate the facts of the 
crimes or potential defenses (R2166:20). Caine testified that hiring a fact investigator 
was not as important as hiring a mitigation expert after the plea agreement was reached 
(R2166:43). However, he conceded that the bulk of the State's penalty phase hearing 
focused on the facts of the crimes (R2166:44). 
The ABA standards require a mental health expert on all appointed capital teams, 
to recognize and develop mental health issues (R2166:160-61). See id. Guideline 4.1. 
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There was no mental health specialist on Ott's team (R2166:20). 
Mitigation experts are normally the first people lawyers hire on capital cases, in 
part because their comprehensive investigation of the defendant's entire background is 
essential to proper and thorough expert analysis of the defendant's mental health issues 
(R2166:158-160). Mitigation experts normally gather all documentation available 
regarding the defendant's medical, family, educational, military, and government history 
so that defense experts can review the history and recognize and identify signs of mental 
illnesses as they appear throughout the defendant's life (R2166:158-59). See Guideline 
10.1 and Commentary. An objectively reasonable lawyer would have hired a mitigation 
investigator from the beginning in this case, because immediate mitigation investigation 
is necessary in cases such as this, which involve obvious mental health issues 
(R2166:162-63). The information was filed against Ott on September 3, 2002. The 
mitigation expert, Vera Ockenfels, was appointed on December 8, 2003 (R2166:171). 
The trial began on March 10, 2004. No mitigation investigation was performed before 
Ockenfels was hired (T 135). The competency and other mental health evaluators were 
not provided any background information on Ott, but instead performed their evaluations 
"cold," on the basis of police reports (R2166:135). 
The mitigation expert, Vera Ockenfels, repeatedly informed the defense lawyers 
that she needed more time to complete the mitigation investigation, and needed more 
records and more specialists but the lawyers made no motion for a continuance 
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(R2166:36). Despite conceding these facts, Caine testified that the mitigation case was 
absolutely prepared (R2166:37). Aric Cramer testified in contrast that time ran out before 
the mitigation expert's investigation was complete (R2166:136-37).n 
The defense team's failure to investigate the case constituted objectively deficient 
performance. See, e ^ , ABA Guidelines, supra. Evaluation of the circumstances 
surrounding Dr. Egli's testimony and the assessment of Ott's competency and mental 
illnesses, provided infra, confirms that the factual and mitigation investigations were not 
complete, and prejudiced Ott procedurally and evidentially, in violation of the ABA 
standards, Strickland, Templin and other controlling authorities discussed herein. 
Caine's pleading Ott to capital homicide and other serious offenses without 
investigating the case fully first, and proceeding unprepared to the penalty phase hearing 
are two pervasive examples of his making choices to Ott's detriment and Wilson's 
benefit. See Lovell supra. The actual conflict of interest alleviates the need for Ott to 
establish traditional prejudice. See Cuyler, supra. 
B. MISHANDLING OF OTT'S COMPETENCY AND 
MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES BEFORE LEARNING OF DR. 
EGLI'S DIAGNOSES OF OTT 
11
 Vera Ockenfels' affidavit avers that she was hired in October of 2003, and that 
the mitigation investigation was radically incomplete, particularly with regard to Ott's 
mental illnesses and the influence of his military career on his physical and mental health. 
The court declined to admit the affidavit into evidence but accepted it as a proffer of what 
she would testify to, and took under advisement Ott's motion for a continuance to 
facilitate her testimony (R2166:37-38). Ott renewed this motion (R2064). 
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"No person who is incompetent to proceed shall be tried or punished for a public 
offense." Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-1. Federal due process holds that a person is 
competent to stand trial or plead guilty only if he has "sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and ... has a rational as 
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky v. United States, 
362 U.S. 402, 402 (I960)(per curiam). See also Godinez v. Moran. 509 U.S. 389, 397-
402 (1993). State law may be more rigorous, e..g, Godinez at 402, and in Utah, it is. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-2 provides: 
For the purposes of this chapter, a person is incompetent to proceed 
if he is suffering from a mental disorder or mental retardation resulting 
either in: 
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him or of the punishment specified for the offense 
charged; or 
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. 
The fundamental elements of due process guaranteed by the Utah Constitution in 
the context of criminal cases are 
(a) the existence of a competent person, body, or agency authorized by law 
to determine the questions; (b) an inquiry into the merits of the question by 
such person, body or agency; (c) notice to the person of the inauguration 
and purpose of the inquiry and the time at which such person should appear 
if he wishes to be heard; (d) right to appear in person or by counsel; (e) fair 
opportunity to submit evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses; (f) 
judgment to be rendered upon the record thus made. 
Christiansen v. Harris, 1563 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). Elements (c), (d), and (e), supra, 
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cannot be provided if the defendant is incompetent. See State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 
1236 (Utah 1989) ("A mentally incompetent defendant can provide no defense, and 
proceedings against such a defendant do not comport with due process."). 
In what was then a death penalty case, counsel for Ott filed a competency petition 
which was based on: 
(a) A history of mental instability that apparently has included two or 
three suicide attempts, self inflicted wounds, the necessity of maintaining 
prescriptions of severe mood altering medications such as paxil and xanax, 
recent findings by the Department of Human Services relating to the 
behavior of the defendant, and that the defendant was placed on suicide 
watch for three weeks immediately following his incarceration. 
(b) A request from Dr. Drury from McKay Dee Hospital on or about 
August 6, 2002, that a "complete mental evaluation" be completed on the 
defendant. 
(R. 39-45). 
The court ordered a competency evaluation (R. 46-52), as was required by Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 77-15-3 and 77-15-4 (requiring competency evaluation if petition is filed, 
or if court raises the issue sua sponte), and due process of law, see, e.g., Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 152, 178-82 (1975) (defendant's suicide attempt and irrational pretrial 
behavior raised competency issue, and trial court's failure to inquire into competency 
violated due process of law); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966) (due process 
required competency evaluation when defendant attempted suicide and was previously 
confined as a psychopath). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-5(4), at least two experts should have addressed all 
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relevant factors, including: 
(a) the defendant's present capacity to: 
(i) comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations 
against him; 
(ii) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; 
(iii) comprehend and appreciate the range and nature of 
possible penalties, if applicable, that may be imposed in the 
proceedings against him; 
(iv) engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; 
(v) understand the adversary nature of the proceedings against 
him; 
(vi) manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and 
(vii) testify relevantly, if applicable; 
(b) the impact of the mental disorder, or mental retardation, if any, on the 
nature and quality of the defendant's relationship with counsel; 
(c) if psychoactive medication is currently being administered: 
(i) whether the medication is necessary to maintain the 
defendant's competency; and 
(ii) the effect of the medication, if any, on the defendant's 
demeanor and affect and ability to participate in the 
proceedings. 
As counsel for Ott recognized in moving for a continuance of the competency 
hearing (R. 70-72), Dr. Higashi's report was patently inadequate. It generally opines that 
Ott was "rational enough to stand trial on his own behalf," but really does not specifically 
address a single one of the statutory criteria listed above. 
The joint report of Dr. Nilsson and Dr. Porter reflects that they were asked by trial 
counsel to address "competency, understanding awareness and responsibility of the crime, 
and for better understanding mitigating factors from his medical developmental neuro 
developmental, and medical history." It was improper for defense counsel to seek such a 
broad evaluation in combination with the competency evaluation, because defense 
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lawyers in capital cases represent people with rights against self-incrimination, and are 
supposed to have the defendant's guilt/innocence, mental health and mitigation 
investigations conducted by independent investigators and experts whose work product 
are privileged and confidential, and which defense team members are not required to turn 
everything over to the prosecution and trial court, as competency evaluators are 
(R2166:161, 163). See, e.g., ABA Guidelines 4.1, 10.4 and 10.7 (recognizing need for 
thorough investigation of guilt and penalty phase and mental health assessment and 
confidentiality of related communications). 
The mental health experts who evaluated Ott for competency and potential 
defenses prior to Ockenfels' coming on the case performed the evaluations without 
essential records regarding medical, mental health, school, background or family history 
(R2166:135). No mitigation work done before Ockenfels was hired (R2166:135). The 
competency evaluations were premature because the lawyers should have investigated 
Ott's history and hired a private mental health expert first (R2166:163). Ott's evaluators 
were mainly given only police reports, and they should have had the relevant records of 
his history (R2166:164). Ott was evaluated by people who were given inadequate 
foundational information (R2166:165). 
The joint report of Nilsson and Porter does not specifically address any of the 
statutory competency factors, but instead contains fifteen pages of Ott's personal history 
and psychological testing and comments about the crimes, which were undoubtedly very 
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helpful to the prosecution's preparation of its guilt and penalty phase cases, but which did 
very little to address the issue of competency. Of the entire report by Porter and Nillson, 
only one paragraph directly addresses the general issue of competency, indicating 
perfunctorily that Ott was competent, but then making several assertions that are radically 
inconsistent with the legal definition of and statutory criteria establishing competency, 
listed supra. That paragraph states: 
Mr. Ott's characteristics also make it difficult for him to participate 
consistently in a legal proceeding in representing himself. By traditional 
standards of assessment, he is competent to stand trial. However, given his 
obsessiveness, reactivity, volatility and paranoia, he is at significant risk to 
make poor judgments or act in contradiction to the required course of the 
proceedings. Depending upon the circumstance an the course and flow of 
events, he is likely to be able to perform under conditions that are not 
particularly confrontive or stressful but is likely to lose control relatively 
quickly, becoming particularly reactive, irrational, and rigid in problem 
solving ability. 
Nillson and Porter report, page 12. Obviously, Mr. Ott's upcoming trial for his very life 
would by nature have been "confrontive or stressful," rendering him out of control, 
irrational, reactive and rigid in problem solving - in a word, incompetent. See, e.g. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-2, supra. 
At the hearing on the competency petition, counsel for Ott did not seek 
supplementation or correction or a hearing on the reports of Higashi, Porter and Nillson, 
but instead indicated that they wished to withdraw the competency petition because they 
were satisfied with the evaluation of Higashi, although not necessarily with his protocols, 
and with the evaluation of Nillson and Porter (R. 1366 at 2). The prosecutor indicated 
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that given the presumption of competency, and the reports from the examiners, the State 
did not oppose the withdrawal of the petition (R. 1366 at 3). The court indicated that it 
had not read the Nilsson/Porter report in detail, but did see that the report indicated that 
Ott was competent, and that the Higashi report found Ott rational to stand trial (R. 1366 at 
3-4). The court then had counsel for Ott question him regarding the withdrawal of the 
petition (R. 1366 at 5). Trial counsel then asked Ott the following series of leading 
questions: 
Mr. Morrison: Mr. Ott, you understand why you are here today, is that 
correct? 
Mr. Ott: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Morrison: Would you tell the court what your understanding is. 
Mr. Ott: To determine competency. 
Mr. Morrison: You know there's been two evaluations performed by 
different doctors on you; is that correct? 
Mr. Ott: Yes. 
Mr. Morrison: In fact, they interviewed you at the Davis County Jail. 
Mr. Ott: Yes. 
Mr. Morrison: You answered the questions they asked you. 
Mr. Ott: Yes. 
Mr. Morrison: You are satisfied with their conclusion that you are 
competent to stand trial. 
Mr. Ott: Yes. 
Mr. Morrison: You understand what that means. 
Mr. Ott: Yes. 
Mr. Morrison: You are ready to go forward. 
Mr. Ott: Yes, I am. 
Mr. Morrison: Mr. Harward also asked me to ask him that to have his 
arraignment put on the record that he is in agreement in fact with our 
withdrawal of the motion of the petition to - the petition to withdraw on 
competency. Is that correct? 
Mr. Ott: Yes. 
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(R. 1366 at 5). 
There were actually three examiners, not two, and from their reports and from trial 
counsel's acceptance of the reports, it appears that neither the clinical professionals nor 
the lawyers understood the concept of legal competency or the legal criteria which should 
have been investigated. Mr. Ott, who had no independent training in that field, and who 
was obviously mentally ill, was in no position to assess his own competency. E.g. Pate v. 
Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966) (incompetent defendant cannot waive his own 
competency). Even if Ott were properly called upon to opine on his own competency, 
counsel failed to address the proper statutory criteria or legal definitions in leading Ott to 
testify that he was competent. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4, supra. 
At trial, Ott's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Egli, testified that in the space of 6 months, 
Ott was getting his emotions and ability to express them under control and his mood 
stabilized, but that at the time of trial, his medication was still not fully evaluated (R. 
1378 at 89-93). This testimony again pointed to Ott's incompetency. 
While John Caine testified that his years of experience as a lawyer qualified him to 
assess Ott's competency (R2166:22), the ABA Guidelines recognize that lawyers who 
have no special training in mental health must hire qualified experts to accurately perform 
such assessments. See Guideline 4.1. The Commentary to Guideline 4.1 explains: 
Counsel's own observations of the client's mental status, while 
necessary, can hardly be expected to be sufficient to detect the array of 
conditions (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder, fetal alcohol syndrome, 
pesticide poisoning, lead poisoning, schizophrenia, mental retardation) that 
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could be of critical importance. Accordingly, Subsection A (2) mandates 
that at least one member of the defense team (whether one of the four 
individuals constituting the smallest allowable team or an additional team 
member) be a person qualified by experience and training to screen for 
mental or psychological disorders or defects and recommend such further 
investigation of the subject as may seem appropriate. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
The record independently reflects that Caine was not qualified to assess 
competency, because he viewed the evaluations by the alienists to be satisfactory 
(R2166:22), despite their legally inadequate nature in failing to address the statutory 
criteria and despite the fact that one of the reports pointed to Ott's incompetency. 
Caine9 s assertion in his affidavit and testimony that he did not learn of Ott's 
bipolar disorder and the significance of his improper medication until Ott told him about 
feeling better on Dr. Egli's medication fewer than 30 days before trial began on March 
10, 2004 (R2166:22-25), further counters the notion that Caine was qualified to assess 
Ott's competency. Particularly given that Caine received notice of Egli's diagnosis of Ott 
as bipolar in December of 2003, after seeking and obtaining a court order for those 
records (R2166:34-35), that Caine had studied bipolar disorder and was in possession of 
publications discussing the disorder and improper medication from other cases and 
because his own son suffered from bipolar disorder (R2166:25, 39), Caine's failure to 
recognize, investigate and present this issue properly demonstrates that Caine was not 
qualified to assess Ott's mental illnesses or competency. 
Capital lawyers with mentally ill clients have a greater duty to protect their clients' 
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rights and to folly investigate their competency, because the clients' own judgment is 
impaired. See e.g., Williamson v. Ward, 110F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1997). When 
lawyers representing potentially incompetent clients rely on inadequate evaluations and 
fail to pursue current and complete competency evaluations, this constitutes objectively 
deficient performance. See id-at 1513-19. If there is a reasonable probability that the 
client was tried while incompetent, the objectively deficient performance of the lawyer is 
viewed as prejudicial. See id. at 1520. 
Prior to trial, Ott's defense lawyers knew that Ott had a documented history of 
mental illnesses, that he had been diagnosed with very serious mental illnesses including 
bipolar disorder and PTSD (e.g. R. 1377:138), and that he had received and taken 
numerous prescription drugs for mental illness prior to, during and after the crimes, and 
during the pretrial and trial proceedings (e.g. R. 1377:140). In the months before the 
crimes and the trial, Ott attempted suicide numerous times (e.g. R. 1376: 235; R. 
1377:143, 157; Defense Exhibit 8 pp. 29, 35, R. 1377:153-61; Defense Exhibit 8 p. 49). 
The tapes of the Idaho extradition hearings document that he was not tracking court 
proceedings at the outset of the case, and in his statements to the officers who transported 
him from Idaho, Ott referred to hearing voices prompting him to go to the scene of the 
crimes, and to being able to recall only bits and pieces of what had occurred (R. 1382: 
281-83). The competency evaluations that were performed were facially inadequate 
because they failed to address the proper legal criteria (R. 70-72, 78), and were 
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undermined before they were ever performed by trial counsel's failure to conduct a 
mitigation investigation in timely fashion and provide the evaluators with the essential 
information (R2166:135, 163-65). Certainly when the trial lawyers learned of Ott's late 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder and the fact that that illness and medication could have 
influenced him so profoundly as to have fomented conduct as irrational as his crimes 
(R2166:22-24, 34-35), and heard from Dr. Egli that Ott was in the process of getting his 
emotions and moods and medication stabilized at the time of trial (1378:89-93), the 
lawyers should have recognized the need for a full and legally adequate competency 
evaluation. See Williamson, supra. 
The foregoing facts establish a reasonable likelihood that Ott was incompetent 
during the trial, particularly when they are viewed along with Dr. Egli's testimony 
concerning how people with Ott's illnesses may be delusional, out of control, unable to 
form intent, unable to act judiciously, unable to understand other people's intentions or 
the consequences or magnitude of their own behavior, and prone to feeling victimized and 
persecuted and reacting inappropriately (R2166:110-113), and that Ott was in the process 
of getting his emotions and moods and medication stabilized at the time of the penalty 
phase hearing (1378:89-93). Trial counsel's performance was thus both objectively 
deficient and prejudicial. See Williamson, supra. 
The fact that trial counsel had Ott evaluated for an insanity defense shows 
objectively deficient performance as well, given that there really is no meaningful 
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insanity defense in Utah (unless the defendant in a murder case is acting under a delusion 
that he is attacking something that is not human - a claim that has never been made in this 
case12), and given that such evaluations normally accomplish nothing for the defense and 
may provide the government with more evidence that may be harmful to the defendant's 
position. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (defining insanity as lacking the 
mental state required for the offense); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1995)(if 
defendant is deluded to believe that he is killing an enemy soldier, he has no insanity 
defense, but if defendant is deluded to believe he is squeezing a grapefruit, he does). An 
objectively reasonable attorney would not have requested an insanity defense evaluation 
or pled him not guilty by reason of insanity, because Utah law is so hard to meet and it 
did not appear that there was any evidence that would have been adequate to mount an 
insanity defense (R2166:165). 
Contrary to Caine's testimony that the psychologists who examined Ott opined 
unanimously that Ott's mental illnesses and life circumstances did not contribute to the 
crimes (R2166:66), the report of Nillson and Porter discussed Ott's brain injury and Gulf 
12The insanity evaluation by Dr. Nielsen provides several pages of aggravating 
evidence against Ott, and contains Ott's contention that he went to his house with the 
intent to burn it down and kill himself. There is no claim in that report that Ott did not 
know that Allen Lawrence was human when he attacked him. (R. 218). 
The insanity evaluation by Dr. Wooten likewise reflects Ott's awareness that both 
Allen and Lacey Lawrence were humans, and contains no claim that he did not know they 
were humans (although there is no indication he knew Lacey was in the house on the 
night of the offenses)(R. 219). 
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War experience and their causing him to be impulsive and unable to control himself. The 
report reflects that as a result of his mental illnesses and history, Ott was "unusually 
vulnerable to the sequence of events leading to the fire," and "lost control of his ability to 
regulate his behavior." The report recommends further testing for mental illnesses. See 
id. at pages 11-12. The record before the Court establishes that these issues were never 
properly investigated or presented on Ott's behalf.13 While Caine testified (incorrectly) 
that Dr. Egli was the only expert who had evaluated Ott who diagnosed him and found a 
causal link between his illnesses and his crimes (R2166:66), he conceded that Egli's 
analysis was consistent with the DSM and correct, and could have been confirmed and 
testified to by other experts (2166:71-72). 
While Caine's affidavit and testimony before the trial court indicate that Ott told 
his lawyers he did not want mental health issues raised to justify his conduct or in his 
defense (R2166:23), Caine conceded that Ott fully cooperated with all the various mental 
health evaluations, told Caine about his improved mental health as a result of Egli's 
treatment, and wanted his mental health issues to be asserted in mitigation (R2166:23-24). 
Aric Cramer testified that Ott did not limit the presentation of mental health issues 
(R2166:138). Ott's proffer likewise indicated that he did not instruct his lawyers to avoid 
13Pleadings from the prosecution have asserted that the defense team hired Dr. 
Barbuto to perform an EEG on Ott. At the 23B hearing, Caine testified that Barbuto went 
and saw Ott at the prison and interviewed him (R2166:20, 28), but there was no proof of 
further testing. 
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or omit mental health defenses (R2166:176). 
It is clear that the defense lawyers did not limit their investigation of Ott's mental 
illnesses based on any instructions from him; Caine testified that the mitigation case was 
fully investigated (R2166:37), that there were no possible claims to be made regarding an 
insanity defense, diminished mental capacity, imperfect self defense, extreme emotional 
distress, guilty and mentally ill, and that if any of these claims had been available, he 
would have raised them (R2166:22-23). Under the relevant law, appointed capital 
lawyers have an independent duty to investigate mitigation, regardless of their client's 
contrary wishes. See Nguyen, supra. 
As is demonstrated further herein, the trial lawyers' objectively deficient failure to 
properly investigate and address Ott's mental illnesses was prejudicial. See Templin, 
supra. 
Caine's willingness to plead Ott to capital homicide and other serious offenses and 
proceed through a penalty phase when the whole record of the case and the very evidence 
Caine presented pointed to Ott's incompetency demonstrates that, rather than zealously 
representing his client, Ott, he was influenced to serve the interests of his client, Wilson, 
who was advocating the wishes of the victims to get the case tried and over with (R2166: 
6, 85-86). This actual conflict of interest relieves Ott of the burden of showing prejudice. 
See Lovell supra. 
C. FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT EVIDENCE 
OF OTT'S BIPOLAR DISORDER, PTSD, AND BRAIN 
52 
DAMAGE 
In capital penalty phases, the most important two issues for a jury to assess are 
whether a defendant's mental illnesses influenced or drove the criminal behavior, and 
whether the causative illnesses can be treated (R2166:168). Expert witnesses are required 
because jurors are not naturally adept at understanding these issues (R2166:166). 
Properly prepared experts are necessary to explain in detail how criminal conduct is 
influenced by mental illness (R2166:166). Criminal defense lawyers are expected to 
investigate their experts, particularly in capital cases, to insure that those who are called 
have solid credentials are not subject to personal attack or impeachment (R2166:161-62). 
When lawyers are concerned about whether their experts may be impeached by 
questionable evidence, the lawyers are free to obtain rulings from the court prior to trial 
by filing motions in limine. Rg,, Ut. R. Crim. P. 12(c); Utah R. Evid. 104. When 
lawyers obtain pivotal information immediately prior to trial, they must move to continue 
trials so they can investigate the evidence and consult appropriate experts (R2166:162). 
Assuming that the nature of the crimes alone did not provide obvious clues of Ott's 
mental illnesses, the expansive competency report of Nillson and Porter put the defense 
lawyers on official notice that Ott's mental illness may have contributed significantly to 
his crimes and required further analysis. See id. at pages 12-13. Pleadings from the 
prosecution have asserted that the defense team hired Dr. Barbuto to perform an EEG on 
Ott. At the 23B hearing, Caine testified that Barbuto went and saw Ott at the prison and 
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interviewed him (R2166:20, 28), but there was no proof of further testing by Barbuto. 
In August of 2003, before the pleas and penalty phase, Dr. Egli, a psychiatrist at 
the Utah State Prison, diagnosed Ott with bipolar disorder (R. 1378:88). On September 
12, 2003, counsel for Ott withdrew his pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity and notice 
of affirmative defense. On October 14, 2003, the parties stipulated that the prison should 
release Ott's records pertaining to his bipolar disorder (R. 925-31). On October 17, 2003, 
the trial court ordered those records released (R. 941-43). The prison faxed the records to 
defense counsel on December 12, 2003 (R2166:34-35). The defense hired no expert to 
address the bipolar and medication issues, but instead opted to proceed with Egli as the 
expert (R2166:36). 
During the penalty phase, which began on March 25, 2004, Came called Dr. Egli 
to testify, but prefaced this testimony with Caine's admission that he had failed to give 
the prosecution proper notice of Egli's testimony, and thus would not ask Dr. Egli any 
questions concerning how Ott's bipolar condition may have influenced his behavior 
during the offenses, or how his condition influenced Ott's ability to control himself, or 
Ott's mental state (R. 1378:53-55). 
Dr. Egli testified that he had only been given a few days' notice before he was 
called to testify, and that he was not able to review the records (R. 1378:101). Dr. Egli 
provided general testimony on the condition of bipolar disorder, and on how proper 
medication of Ott's bipolar disorder coincided with improvement of Ott's institutional 
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behavioral history (R. 1378:83-103). He also testified that the antidepressant Paxil might 
cause or exacerbate manic behavior (R. 1378:87). 
Caine argued beyond the agreement he had with the prosecutor and court and 
beyond evidence in closing arguments to the jury, but acknowledged that jurors are 
instructed that lawyer's arguments are not evidence, and are presumed to follow those 
instructions (R2166:67). 
After the jury returned its verdict, in arguing sentencing issues to the court, Caine 
told the court that since the Ott jury's verdict, he had been studying bipolar disorder and 
had learned that it is a "real problem" if bipolar people are treated with antidepressants 
(R. 1380:13). Caine argued to the court at sentencing that the national studies and drug 
warning labels that taught him this had all been generated since the penalty phase in Ott's 
case(R. 1380:13).14 
While Caine argued to the court at the sentencing hearing that Ott's improperly 
medicated bipolar disorder caused him to "act out" and exacerbated his behavior during 
the crime, and claimed that the defense presented evidence of this physical condition to 
14Caine received notice of Egli's diagnosis of Ott as bipolar in December of 2003, 
after seeking and obtaining a court order for those records (R2166:34-35). Long before 
then, Caine had studied bipolar disorder and was in possession of publications discussing 
the disorder and issues surrounding improper medication, both as a result of his 
experience in other cases and because his own son suffered from bipolar disorder 
(R2166:25,39). 
As a member of the bar, Caine owed a duty of candor to the court, regardless of 
whether he was under oath. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.3. 
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the jury, and that this was "one of the most difficult things for [them] to deal with," the 
record actually shows that Caine's position during the penalty phase trial was that neither 
the defense nor the prosecution could ask Dr. Egli any questions regarding whether Ott's 
behavior during the crimes was consistent with his mental illness, whether his mental 
illness influenced his ability to control himself, or whether he could be cured (R. 1378:52-
55). 
It was not until the 23b remand proceedings that Dr. Egli was given the relevant 
records and information and an opportunity to study it (R2166:96-133). Once Egli was 
properly informed and prepared, he was able to diagnose Ott's genetic bipolar disorder, 
PTSD resulting from Ott's service as a veteran, and personality change stemming from 
childhood injuries — being hit in the head with a baseball bat, being thrown from a bicycle 
into a telephone pole, and being hung on a clothesline to the point of asphyxiation by his 
siblings (R2166:100-101). Once Egli had an opportunity to properly analyze the relevant 
information, he was able to ascertain how the illnesses and the medications Ott was 
improperly prescribed may have caused or significantly contributed to Ott's specific 
behaviors during the incidents at Antelope Island, at the Mall, at the McKay Dee 
Hospital, and on the night of the crimes (R2166:106-l 10). Once Egli was given the 
necessary information and time to review it, he was able to analyze it and explain how 
Ott's mental illnesses and improper medication likely caused him to misperceive that he 
was being attacked, lose control, and react with extreme and excessive rage and violence 
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without being able to curb his response or understand its excessiveness or the 
unlawfulness of his conduct on the night of the crimes (R2166:106-113). 
After the 23b remand, Caine drafted and signed an affidavit and also testified in 
court that it was only after Ott pled guilty that Ott told Caine that he had been feeling 
better on the medications prescribed by Dr. Egli, and that it was this conversation which 
prompted Caine to talk to Dr. Egli and learn of Ott9 s bipolar condition and Egli's opinion 
that Ott's improper medication and mental illness resulted in his criminal behavior 
(R2166:22-24). The affidavit and testimony were both under oath (Exhibit 1, page 1, T. 
16). 
In contrast, Caine conceded while under oath at the hearing that he received notice 
of Egli's diagnosis of Ott as bipolar in December of 2003, after seeking and obtaining a 
court order for the prison records (R2166:34-35), and that Caine had studied bipolar 
disorder and had publications discussing the disorder and improper medication as a result 
of his work in other cases and because his own son suffered from bipolar disorder 
(R2166:25, 39). Caine testified that Egli reinforced what Caine knew before taking this 
case about bipolar disorder and improper medication causing manic behavior (R2166:40). 
Aric Cramer testified that the defense obtained the prison records on December 12, 2003, 
that the defense knew Ott was bipolar in December of 2003, and that the defense had 
plenty of time to file an expert witness notice and obtain a different mental health expert 
if necessary before Ott pled on March 16,2004, and the penalty phase started the next day 
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(R2166:150-51). 
Caine asserted in his affidavit and at the evidentiary hearing that he, the other 
defense lawyers, the prosecutor and Ott agreed that Dr. Egli could testify regarding Ott's 
improved institutional behavior, but would not testify regarding the influence of Ott's 
bipolar disorder and improper medication during Ott's crimes, despite Caine's lack of 
expert witness notice (R2166:26). According to Caine, under this agreement, the defense 
abstained from seeking a continuance in order to mollify the victims, who were 
pressuring Wilson to get the trial done (R2166:26). In exchange, Wilson agreed not to 
object to the lack of expert notice, not to impeach Dr. Egli with certain materials, and not 
to call a rebuttal expert (R2166:26). 
While Caine testified that Ott consented to the agreement regarding Egli's limited 
testimony (R2166:27, 30), he conceded that he was unsure whether Ott's assent was given 
after a full discussion with Caine regarding the agreement, or was limited to Ott's failure 
to object in open court when Caine announced the limited nature of Egli's testimony 
(R2166:27). Ott's proffer indicated that the lawyers did not inform him of any agreement 
or limitation on Dr. Egli's testimony, aside from what was stated in court on the record 
(R2166:176). In contrast to Caine's belief that co-counsel, Aric Cramer, was present 
when Caine and Wilson reached the agreement (R2166:30), Cramer testified that he did 
not participate in making any agreement between the defense and the prosecutor 
regarding Dr. Egli's testimony, and was not present when anyone discussed any such 
58 
agreement with Ott (R2166:138). Wilson testified that the agreement was reached 
between himself and Caine, and did not involve co-counsel (R2166:76). 
Caine's supposed strategy to limit impeachment and rebuttal of Egli by presenting 
his testimony without notice not only limited the substance of Dr. Egli's testimony so he 
could not address the impact of Ott's illnesses and improper medication on Ott's crimes, 
but also undercut the effectiveness of the testimony he did present, because Dr. Egli did 
not even have an opportunity to review his own records prior to testifying (R. 1378:101), 
and was only given information by Caine pertaining to Ott's incarceration history 
(R2166:24). 
Caine contended that his calling Dr. Egli to provide limited testimony was 
beneficial to Ott, because this prevented the State from impeaching Dr. Egli or calling a 
rebuttal witness (R2166:63). Caine said it was his strategy to show that if properly 
medicated, Ott could be trusted with parole someday (R2166:48, 58). 
The trial court expressly found that Caine's entering into the stipulation with 
Wilson to limit Egli's testimony and refrain from seeking a continuance was legitimate 
trial strategy because Egli's testimony was "unimpeached and unrebutted by the State 
(T:54-55, 69, 70)." (R2143 findings 25 at 26). 
The portion of that finding indicating that Egli's testimony was unimpeached and 
unrebutted is again a negative finding for which the evidence cannot be marshaled in the 
traditional sense. Pages 48, 54, 55, 58, 69 and 70 of the transcript of the 23B hearing 
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transcript contain the testimony of John Caine that his "strategy" to put on limited 
testimony from Dr. Egli instead of seeking a continuance to allow Dr. Egli or another 
expert time to prepare analysis of Ott's mental illnesses and their role in his crimes, was 
beneficial to Ott, because as part of the stipulation he reached with Wilson, the State 
called no rebuttal expert and did not impeach Egli. See id. 
While Caine9s testimony supports part of the court's finding, by reading the actual 
trial transcript, this Court can see the clearly erroneous nature of the findings. During the 
trial, the prosecutor was able to refute Egli without resorting to the sealed evidence which 
may or may not have been admissible to impeach Egli, and without calling his own expert 
witness. He was able to do this by simply cross-examining Egli regarding his huge 
caseload at the prison, his lack of time spent and familiarity with Ott, and the fact that 
Egli did not have time to review or access to the relevant records (R2166:61, R1378: 93-
102, 104-06). In cross-examining Egli and in his arguments, the prosecutor was able to 
emphasize the difficulty of insuring proper medication for Ott's illness should he be 
released, and by arguing that Ott might not be properly medicated in the future 
(R2166:61, R1378: 93-102, 104-06). In aid of the prosecution's position on this point, 
the defense introduced evidence that Ott failed to take his medication (R. 1376: 184, R. 
1377: 202), and did not introduce Egli's key defense testimony that Ott has a history of 
taking his medicine, that the medicine he at times had not taken was the antidepressant 
which had catapulted him into manic phases (R2166:132). Nor did the defense present 
60 
essential defense testimony readily available from Dr. Egli that, given Ott's history of 
more than forty years of obeying the law without violence, Ott was more likely to be 
treated successfully (R2166: 114, 129). 
Caine intimated that his supposed strategy avoided unspecified issues that might 
have been raised to counter Dr. Egli's testimony (R2166:40), and speculated that the 
prosecution might have called opposing experts had he given proper notice (R2166:71-
72). However, he conceded that he was not aware of any rebuttal evidence the State had 
with regard to Dr. Egli's testimony (R2166:67), and that Dr. Egli's testimony regarding 
Ott's mental illnesses, improper medication and consequential manic behavior during the 
crimes was very standard and textbook, and that Egli's diagnoses of Ott were correct 
(R2166:72). 
Caine conceded that he likely could have found an expert without impeachment 
problems who could testify regarding Ott's illnesses and medications and their impact on 
his crimes if Caine had taken the time to do so (R2166:72). As detailed in a sealed 
memorandum filed prior to the 23b hearing, the impeachment material at issue may well 
have been inadmissible at trial, and the admissibility of that evidence certainly could and 
should have been litigated prior to trial to insure that the complete and relevant evidence 
got to the jury either through Dr. Egli or some other expert. See Ut. R. Crim. P. 12(c); Ut. 
R.Evid. 104. 
Aric Cramer testified that he was aware of no trial strategy reason for failing to 
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move for a continuance, although the trial lawyers were pressured to get the case done 
(R2166:146-47). After reviewing Caine's affidavit, the mental evaluations, the 23b 
affidavits and facts of this case as presented in Ott's 23b memoranda, experienced capital 
defense attorney Lynn Donaldson testified that in this case, which turns on mental health 
issues, he could not imagine a strategic reason for failing to move to continue to properly 
investigate and present the pertinent mental health evidence (R2166:174). 
In light of what the record thus demonstrates, trial counsel's failures with regard to 
evidence concerning Ott's mental illnesses and medication issues and their impact on his 
crime were not and cannot be viewed as reasonable trial strategy. See, e ^ , Fisher v. 
Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1307 (10th Cir. 2002). In Fisher, the court conditionally reversed 
a capital conviction and death sentence after holding that trial counsel's trial performance 
in, inter alia, bolstering the State's case, and failing to present a defense theory and hold 
prosecution to its burden of proof, was objectively deficient and prejudicial in context of 
a weak government case. The court succinctly rejected the theory that defense counsel's 
omissions and commissions amounted to valid trial strategy, stating: 
Where an attorney accidentally brings out testimony that is damaging 
because he has failed to prepare, his conduct cannot be called a strategic 
choice: an event produced by the happenstance of counsel's uninformed and 
reckless cross-examination cannot be called a "choice11 at all. 
Id. at 1296. The court reviewed the overall performance of the lawyer, including 
instances of adequate performance and inadequate performance, and concluded that the 
record did not honestly reflect a coherent trial strategy, but reflected a lack of preparation 
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and diligence which undermined the necessary functioning of the adversary system. Id. at 
1296-1307. 
Here, the defense failed to investigate Ott's mental illnesses and their impact on 
his crimes and called an unprepared and vulnerable expert witness to testify to limited 
facts at the last minute. Because of the defense's failure to prepare the witness, to litigate 
the admissibility of the impeachment evidence, to seek a continuance, and/or to seek a 
substitute expert, the witness was required to refrain from testifying about the most 
important factor for the jury to consider - the extent to which Ott's moral culpability for 
his crimes was diminished by his overpowering mental illnesses and their improper 
medication. This cobbling together of a defense did not protect the witness from 
refutation, but rather, facilitated it, because the witness did not have access to or time to 
review the records and facts underlying the crimes or Mr. Ott. The fact that the defense 
presented evidence in support of the prosecution's rebuttal theory (that Ott would not be 
properly medicated in the future) and failed to present the key defense evidence that Ott 
normally took his medication and sought out mental health treatment, that the drug Ott 
sometimes failed to take was the one that caused his mania, and that his forty years of 
peaceful law abiding life indicated that he was more likely to succeed in treating his 
mental illnesses. This record dispels any notion that Caine was acting pursuant to any 
legitimate trial strategy. Cf. Fisher, supra. 
The trial court's finding that Caine's limitation of Egli's testimony to Ott's one 
63 
illness of bipolar disorder, and omission of testimony concerning Ott's brain damage and 
PTSD was objectively reasonable trial strategy (R2144-45) is clearly erroneous. Caine 
never testified to this effect, and there is no evidence to support the finding. Caine 
testified that he presented evidence of Ott's brain damage and PTSD in the penalty phase 
as part of his articulated strategy to provide the jurors with comprehensive evidence 
concerning Ott's mental illnesses (R2166:52-53). 
The trial court's finding that "Defendant has not pointed to or presented any 
evidence that Caine should have presented, but did not, that was reasonably likely to 
convince the jury to impose upon Defendant an indeterminate prison term of not less than 
20 years and which may be for life." (R.2147, finding 37) appears to be an ultimate legal 
conclusion. The finding is incorrect in intimating that Ott had the burden of proving that 
the evidence was not presented would have convinced the jury to vote for twenty to life, 
because to establish prejudice in this area of the law, he only needed to show that one 
more of his jurors would have voted for a sentence lower than life without parole. 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003). To the extent it is viewed as a finding of 
fact, it is not possible to marshall the evidence in support of it because it is phrased in the 
negative. The evidence which counters the finding is Dr. Egli's detailed testimony 
explaining how Ott's crimes were largely influenced by, if not the product of, the 
convergence of his mental illnesses, improper medication, and incredibly difficult life 
circumstances (R2166: 96-132). 
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The trial court's finding that "Caine's investigation and presentation of mental 
health evidence was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances" (R2146, finding 
36) is actually an application of law to the facts and an ultimate legal conclusion, to 
which this Court need not defer. See, e.g., Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, j^ 58, 150 
P.3d 480. Review of the law confirms that the failure of the trial lawyers to take the time 
and make the effort to investigate and present the mental health evidence was objectively 
deficient and prejudicial, and amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland. 
The lawyers' failure to fully investigate Ott's mental illnesses precluded their 
being able to accurately advise him to plead guilty. The ABA Guidelines require 
appointed capital lawyers to research and investigate all potential defenses, assert all legal 
claims on behalf of their clients, and to fully and accurately inform the clients of the 
ramifications and legal issues involved in their plea negotiations and to let the client make 
an informed choice regarding plea bargaining. See, e.g., ABA Guidelines 10.8, 10.9.1 
and 10.9.2. 
Caine testified that the defense lawyers all agreed that Ott's mental and physical 
conditions had no impact on his plea (R2166:21-22), and that Ott had no mental health 
defenses to the charges (R2166:22-23, 51). Caine testified that Ott's illnesses were solely 
useful under the general mitigation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207, and the special 
mitigation statute (R2166:23). 
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Dr. Egli testified at the 23B hearing that people suffering from bipolar disorder are 
frequently delusional regarding being victimized and the proportionality of their 
responses (R2166:112-113), and because Ott was apparently acting in a manic phase of 
his bipolar disorder on the night of the crimes, and was deluded by his mental illness into 
believing that he was under attack from Allen Lawrence, and unable to appreciate the 
excessiveness of his own attack on Lawrence (R2166:108). Ott's PTSD likely added to 
his mis-perception that he was under attack (R2166:108). This testimony would have 
supported an imperfect self defense claim under the aggravated murder statute, potentially 
reducing Ott's liability on the capital murder charge one degree to non-aggravated 
murder, and reducing Ott's liability on the attempted capital murder charge one degree, to 
attempted murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (3) (2001) version.15 
15Subsection (3) of the applicable 2001 version of the aggravated murder statute 
then provided: 
(3)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated murder or 
attempted aggravated murder that the defendant caused the death of another 
or attempted to cause the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal 
justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct was not legally 
justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (3)(a)(i), emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection 
(3)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (3)(a)(ii) 
shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the 
then existing circumstances. 
66 
Caine's testimony that Ott's mental illnesses were useful under the special 
mitigation statute (R2166:23) clearly demonstrates Caine's failure to research Ott's 
defenses. The special mitigation statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5, if successfully 
raised, reduces murders one level.16 If a special mitigation claim exists in a capital 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) aggravated murder to murder; and 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted murder. 
16Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205.5 provides: 
(1) Special mitigation exists when: 
(a) the actor causes the death of another under circumstances that are not legally justified, 
but the actor acts under a delusion attributable to a mental illness as defined in Section 
76-2-305: and 
(b) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts existed as the defendant believed 
them to be in his delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justification for his conduct. 
(2) This section applies only if the defendant's actions, in light of his delusion, were 
reasonable from the objective viewpoint of a reasonable person. 
(3) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed, injected, or 
ingested alcohol, controlled substances, or volatile substances at the time of the alleged 
offense may not claim mitigation of the offense under this section on the basis of mental 
illness if the alcohol or substance caused, triggered, or substantially contributed to the 
mental illness. 
(4)(a) If the trier of fact finds the elements of an offense as listed in Subsection (4)(b) are 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that the existence of special mitigation under 
this section is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall return a verdict on 
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (4)(b). 
(b) If under Subsection (4)(a) the offense is: 
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of murder; 
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of attempted 
murder; 
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of manslaughter; or 
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homicide case, it must be raised in the guilt phase, because there is no need for a penalty 
phase if the capital murder is reduced to non-aggravated murder through a special 
mitigation verdict. See id. 
The special mitigation affirmative defense surely could have been raised on the 
basis of Dr. Egli's testimony at the 23B hearing. He testified that people suffering from 
bipolar disorder are frequently delusional regarding being victimized and the 
proportionality of their responses (R2166:112-113), and that Ott was apparently acting in 
a manic phase of his bipolar disorder on the night of the crimes, and was deluded by his 
mental illness into believing that he was under attack from Allen Lawrence, and unable to 
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead be found guilty of attempted manslaughter. 
(5)(a) If a jury is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the jury is required to establish the 
existence of the special mitigation. 
(b) If the jury does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a verdict on 
the reduced charge as provided in Subsection (4). 
(c) If the jury finds by a unanimous vote that special mitigation has not been established, 
it shall convict the defendant of the greater offense for which the prosecution has 
established all the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(d) If the jury is unable to unanimously agree whether or not special mitigation has been 
established, the result is a hung jury. 
(6)(a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the trier of fact, it shall return a 
special verdict indicating whether the existence of special mitigation has been found. 
(b) The trier of fact shall return the special verdict at the same time as the general verdict, 
to indicate the basis for its general verdict. 
(7) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any case, reduce the level of an 
offense by more than one degree from that offense, the elements of which the evidence 
has established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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appreciate the excessiveness of his own attack on Lawrence (R2166:108). He also 
testified that Ott's PTSD likely added to his mis-perception that he was under attack 
(R2166:108). However, a claim of special mitigation was never raised on Ott's behalf 
through evidence, proper jury instructions, or a special verdict before or after he entered 
his pleas. 
Dr. Egli testified that Ott's illnesses and medications could definitely have 
influenced the voluntariness of his actions during the crimes, particularly the 
voluntariness of the extremity of his actions and their excessive violence (R2166:110-
111). He testified that the bipolar disorder and past head injury certainly may have made 
Ott unable to control himself (R2166:111). These facts would have supported a defense 
based on fundamental criminal law recognizing that crimes are comprised of acts and the 
intent specified by the legislature, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101, and that to constitute 
criminal acts, the acts must be voluntary, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1). 
Particularly given that the plea form which purported to provide the factual basis 
for the aggravated murder count did not establish that Ott knowingly or intentionally 
killed Lacey Lawrence, and did not assert that he even knew she was present in the home 
at the time he set the fire (R. 1124-25), the record reflects that trial counsel did not 
properly research and advise Ott regarding the entry of the plea. See, e.g.. State v. 
Thurman, 911 P.2d 371 (Utah 1996) (conviction of aggravated murder requires proof of 
knowing and intentional killing). 
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When a defense lawyer fails to accurately research potential defenses and how they 
operate in a capital case, and fails to inform the defendant of the offenses he pleads to and 
the defenses he relinquishes in pleading, the lawyer violates the ABA Guidelines. 
See e.g., ABA Guidelines 10.8, 10.9.1 and 10.9.2. Such conduct is objectively deficient, 
see Wiggins., and renders the guilty plea constitutionally involuntary. See, e.g.. Ivy v. 
Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding ineffective assistance in entry of guilty 
plea, and that plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, in part because lawyer 
failed to inform client of mental health defense and failed to correct the court's 
misstatement during the colloquy indicating that there was no such defense). 
The record reflects a reasonable probability that Ott would have gone to trial in the 
absence of the deficient performance, see Hill v. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52, 29 (1985) 
(defining the prejudice inquiry in this context as requiring this showing). Ott was willing 
to have all mental defenses raised on his behalf (R2166:176), cooperated with every 
mental evaluation sought by his lawyers seeking to raise a mental health defense 
(R2166:23-24), and moved to withdraw his plea in a pro se pleading reflecting that he and 
his family were unable to communicate with Caine to get Caine to make the motion or to 
file the appeal (R. 1299, 1303). 
Review of the relevant law likewise demonstrates that the trial lawyers' failure to 
properly investigate and present Ott's mental illness and medication evidence at the 
penalty phase hearing constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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Every criminal defendant has several related federal constitutional rights to present 
a complete defense to criminal charges against him. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
683 (1985)(ff Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants fa meaningful opportunity 
to present a complete defense.1... We break no new ground in observing that an essential 
component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard. fl)(citations omitted). 
The Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection. An essential element of due 
process provided by article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to 
submit evidence." Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). ff[T]he 
defendants right to present all competent evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed by 
the due process clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7[.]" State v. Harding, 635 
P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981). Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides numerous 
trial rights which also pertain. It states, 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 similarly provides, 
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(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf[.] 
This Court has recognized that a trial lawyer's failure to investigate potential 
defense witnesses constitutes clearly deficient performance and cannot be considered a 
legitimate tactical decision. State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 188-189 (Utah 1990). As 
the Court in Templin recognized, the appellate court need not speculate as to how a jury 
might have assessed the credibility of defense witnesses that trial counsel failed to 
investigate. If the proffer of their testimony establishes prejudice, ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel is established. Id. at 188-189. 
Because this is a capital case and the death penalty was in play up until Ott pled, 
the ABA Guidelines apply to the assessment of trial counsel's trial preparation, 
see Wiggins and Strickland, supra, and further detail trial counsel's obligations to 
investigate and prepare all potentially helpful defense evidence. Guidelines 4.1 and 10.4 
recognize the importance of having a qualified investigator and mental health 
professional on the defense team, and the commentary to those guidelines explain that 
people charged with violent crimes often suffer from mental impairments, and that 
qualified people must thoroughly investigate and assess the case to structure the defense 
case. Guideline 10.7 demands that appointed capital attorneys investigate all potentially 
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helpful defense evidence at every stage of the proceeding. Guideline 10.8 requires 
counsel to assert and preserve all potentially helpful legal claims. See also Guidelines LI 
and 10.11 (also recognizing critical nature of mental health evidence). 
Case law also recognizes the duty of defense lawyers to properly investigate 
mental health issues by hiring qualified experts and providing them with the time and 
resources needed to assess and present the defense positions. See, Caro v. Woodford, 
280 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2002). In Caro, the Ninth Circuit upheld a trial court's habeas 
ruling that trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance in the penalty phase of a 
capital case by failing to properly investigate and present evidence concerning the 
defendant's social history and that the defendant was brain-damaged as a result of his 
exposure to pesticides. Id. The court first found that counsel's failure to investigate 
constituted deficient performance under its own precedent requiring capital counsel to 
investigate all available mitigating evidence and to investigate mental impairments, and 
under Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000), which held that it was objectively 
unreasonable for counsel to fail to investigate and present mitigating evidence concerning 
the defendant's mental defect and social history. Caro at 1254. The Caro court held that 
it constitutes deficient performance to fail to obtain adequate mental health expert 
assistance, and to fail to provide mental health experts with the records needed to properly 
assess the case. Id. at 1254-55. The court noted that there was no strategic reason for 
counsel's deficiencies, and rejected government arguments that counsel had investigated 
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the issues as well as could be expected at that time. Id. at 1255-56. 
In addressing prejudice, the court noted that it was critical for capital defense 
counsel to unearth all mitigating evidence, because the decision in a capital penalty phase 
is not one premised on hard factual determinations, but is instead a moral judgment made 
by weighing the defendant's culpability against the value of his life. Id. at 1256-57. 
Despite evidence showing that the defendant, who shot two teenagers to death and shot 
two other people the same night, stalked one of his victims, lured two others so he could 
shoot them, kidnaped and sexually assaulted other people, and attempted escape and to 
create an alibi, the court found prejudice from failure to present the omitted evidence. Id. 
at 1257. The court reached this conclusion by reviewing the poor quality of defense 
evidence presented, the poor quality of proof of premeditation, and the Williams decision, 
supra, which recognizes that evidence which shows that criminal behavior was not 
controllable or influenced by physiological defects is powerfully mitigating. Id. at 1258. 
Similarly, in Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2004), wherein the defendant 
was originally sentenced to death for five murders, the court held that there was 
ineffective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase, because the defense failed to 
present evidence of the defendant's mental retardation, brain damage, and difficult 
upbringing. Id. In finding deficient performance, the court recognized the ABA 
Guidelines' emphasis of the importance of mental health evidence in capital penalty 
phases. Smith at 942. In finding prejudice, the court reviewed testimony, articles and 
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cases reflecting that capital juries are most swayed by evidence of mental illness and 
organic brain problems. Id. at 942. 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the trial court's rationale that such evidence would have 
painted the defendant as being incurably unstable and out of control, recognizing that the 
jurors were already aware of those facts, but needed evidence to understand why the 
defendant was unstable and out of control. Id. at 943-944. The Court relied on Williams 
v. Taylor, supra, in holding that, despite the strength of the government's aggravating 
case, and the pitiful nature of the mitigating case presented by the defense, there was a 
reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the objectively deficient 
performance in omitting the mitigating evidence. Smith at 944. 
The similar objectively deficient performance in this case was prejudicial. The 
evidence omitted from Ott's mitigation case was hugely important under the ABA 
standards, Williams, Caro and Smith, and under the plain terms of Utah's capital 
sentencing statute, 76-3-207, which provides in relevant part: 
(4) Mitigating circumstances include: 
(a) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
(b) the homicide was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of mental or emotional disturbance; 
(c) the defendant acted under duress ...; 
(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirement of law was impaired as a result of a mental condition, 
intoxication, or influence of drugs[.] 
The pertinent facts discussed above already demonstrate that Ott had no significant 
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prior criminal history. Had the jurors heard the pertinent evidence from Dr. Egli and/or 
other qualified mental health professionals, this would have helped to establish that Ott 
was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance, that Ott was acting under 
duress, and that Ott's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirement of law was impaired as a result of a mental condition, 
intoxication, or influence of drugs. 
The decision to impose a sentence of life without parole is even more amorphous 
than the decision to impose death - in Utah, the sentence of life without parole turns on 
whether the jury finds the sentence "appropriate." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(5)(c). 
Ott's crimes were a radical departure from his law-abiding life, and were greatly 
mitigated by the historical facts of this case, which show that, despite his very difficult 
upbringing and physical and mental challenges, he was a very hardworking provider who 
was trying to keep his family together, and who snapped as a result of his improperly 
medicated bipolar condition, compounded by his post-traumatic stress disorder, and brain 
damage, after he was thrown out of his house and his wife began a romance with another 
man in front of his children in his house. There was no proof of premeditation to kill 
Lacey Lawrence - he did not even know she was in the house when he set it on fire. 
See Statement of Facts, supra. 
The jurors were well aware of Ott's horrific crimes, and as in Williams, Smith and 
Caro, supra, there is a reasonable chance that at least one more of the ten jurors who 
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voted for life without parole would have joined the two who did not, and given Ott the 
hope of parole after serving all his sentences, had they been given a chance to consider 
the significant expert mental illness and improper prescription of medication evidence 
explaining why Ott behaved in the way he did and mitigating his crimes. See Williams, 
Smith and Caro, supra. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (reversing 
capital sentence for ineffective assistance after concluding that if the defense case had 
been handled competently, there was "a reasonable probability that at least one juror 
would have struck a different balance."). Particularly given Dr. Egli's testimony that 
Ott's mental illnesses were treatable, that he had a history of taking his medications 
except the one that caused mania, and that Ott's history of living crime free for more than 
40 years pointed toward a likelihood of successful treatment (R2166:114-16, 129-33), the 
deficient performance of counsel was prejudicial. 
Again, Caine's willingness to plead Ott to capital homicide and other serious 
offenses, and to proceed through the penalty phase unprepared demonstrates that he was 
serving the interests of Wilson to get the case tried to mollify the victims (R2166: 26, 85-
86), rather than loyally and zealously representing Mark Ott. This demonstrates an actual 
conflict of interest, which ends the prejudice inquiry. See, e.g., Lovell, supra. 
D. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO ANONYMOUS JURY 
Trial counsel did not object to Ott's being tried by an anonymous jury (R. 1371:7). 
During voir dire, the court explained to the jurors, 
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In order to protect your privacy and to encourage your candid 
responses, the court has elected to assign each of you a jury number. As 
you entered the courtroom this morning, you were given that number and a 
jury questionnaire. Please be sure to remember that number you were 
given. Brian wanted to tattoo it on your foreheads, but I didn't think that 
was a good idea. But if you'll remember that number that you'll be 
identified with and you'll be addressed by that number throughout the trial 
in order to protect your privacy. 
I would like to make you aware that the list matching the prospective 
juror names and number that have been assigned will be held under seal by 
the court and will not be subject to disclosure. Moreover, although you will 
be required to sign your name on the last page of the questionnaire, this 
page will be removed once you have completed answering all of the 
questions and will also be held under seal by the court. 
(R. 1371 at 7-8). After the jury was selected, the court instructed the jurors that they 
would enter court through a special parking lot, which required them to push a button and 
provide their juror number to enter (R. 1373 at 176). The court told them they would be 
issued pass cards to enter the building through a secure door, so that they would be kept 
"out of the public and protected back here." (R. 1373 at 177). 
After rendering the verdict of life without parole, all twelve jurors requested to 
remain anonymous because they were afraid of Ott's family holding a grudge or seeking 
revenge (R. 1379 at 8-10). 
Review of the pertinent law confirms that in failing to object to the anonymous 
jury, the lawyers performed in an objectively deficient and prejudicial manner. All 
criminal defendants charged with serious crimes are guaranteed the constitutional rights 
to the presumption of innocence and to a fair and impartial jury trial. See Constitution of 
Utah, Article I §§ 7 and 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6; United States Constitution, 
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Amendments VI and XIV § 1. 
The Utah courts jealously guard the criminal defendants' presumption of 
innocence and right to a fair trial, and do not permit indicia of guilt or dangerousness to 
needlessly compromise these rights. See, e.g.. State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34, 999 P.2d 1 
(reaffirming the rule of Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 345 (Utah 1980), that per se 
reversible error occurs if a defendant is tried in prison garb, absent a record waiver of 
right to appear in civilian clothing); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 281 (Utah) 
(approving courtroom security measures that were the least obtrusive available), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1090(1990). 
The rights to the presumption innocence and to a fair and impartial jury trial are 
compromised when jurors are anonymous or referred to by numbers, because jurors infer 
that this unusual procedure is required because their safety is threatened by the defendant, 
and that the defendant is guilty of something dangerous. See, e.g.. State v. Brown, 118 
P.3d 1273, 1279-81 (Kan. 2005) (citing multiple cases and law review articles). 
In Utah, the rule of criminal procedure which sets forth the procedures to be used 
injury selection does not permit the use of anonymous juries, and indicates that jurors 
will be called by name. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a)(1) and (2). The plain language of 
both subsections of the rule define juries as those "whose names are so called" at the end 
of jury selection proceedings. See id. (emphasis added). While Utah Rule of Judicial 
Administration 4-202.02(2)(k) classifies records containing juror names as private until 
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released by the court, and while Rule 4-202.06 (1) permits a trial judge to withhold juror 
names up to five days after a trial, these rules apply to written records, and do not permit 
courts to impanel anonymous juries. See id. These rules should not be interpreted as 
authorizing anonymous juries in all cases, without cause and without precautionary 
measures, because this would needlessly undermine the criminal defendants' rights to the 
presumption of innocence and to a fair and impartial jury trial. See, e.g.. Brown, infra. 
The use of anonymous juries in antithetical to the fundamental values historically 
governing our state courts of record, where everything is supposed to be on the record and 
open to the public, in part to insure that jurors are made to feel accountable for their 
verdicts. See, e.g.. State v. Jordan, 196 P. 565, 616-17 (Utah 1921)(in explaining why 
criminal trials are open to the public, the Court noted that "the presence of interested 
spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility."); 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII § 1 (providing that district courts are courts of record). 
Voir dire proceedings are constitutionally required to be in open court for public 
observation. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 
501, 509-10 (1984) (voir dire proceedings are a part of the trial the public has a right to 
observe, and trial courts must make findings to justify partial closure of voir dire to 
protect juror privacy). Rule 18fs mandates that the jurors be called by name, and the 
constitutions' mandate that jury selection occurs in open court lead to the conclusion that 
trial counsel should have objected to the anonymous jury procedures. See id. See also 
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Jordan, supra. 
Outside of Utah, courts generally refuse to impanel anonymous juries, or to refer to 
jurors by numbers, unless there is proof of a serious threat to juror safety. See Brown, 
118 P.3d 1273, 1279-81, supra. Before impaneling anonymous juries, courts are to weigh 
the prejudice to the defendants' rights to the presumption of innocence and to a fair jury 
trial against heightened concerns about juror safety. Id. Factors courts consider in 
assessing whether anonymous jury proceedings are required include whether the 
defendants are part of an organized crime family or group, whether the defendants have a 
history of jury tampering or similar conduct, and whether there is so much trial publicity 
that chances are higher that jurors may experience intimidating conduct at the hands of 
the defendants, their friends, their enemies, or the general public. E.g., Brown at 1279-
81. See also United States v. Thomas. 757 F.2d 1359, 1364-65 (2d Cir.) (defendants were 
very dangerous participants in organized crime who were involved in multiple mob 
killings and were charged with trying to thwart the judicial process by killing government 
witnesses), cert denied. 474 U.S. 819 (1985). 
Courts impaneling anonymous juries or referring to jurors by number are required 
to take precautions to insure that the defendant's rights to a fair and impartial jury trial 
and to the presumption of innocence are protected to the extent possible. Id. For 
instance, courts sometimes misinform the jurors that the anonymity is required to protect 
the jurors from being harassed by the press or that such procedures are commonly used, 
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and should instruct the jurors that the procedures are not to be interpreted as reflecting on 
the defendants' guilt or innocence. Brown at 1280-82. See also Thomas, supra, 757 F.2d 
at 1365 n.l (judge gave jurors a lengthy explanation of how the high publicity case might 
result in people prying into their private affairs and creating publicity that might distort 
the fact finding process). 
In Brown, the court reversed convictions for felony murder and attempted robbery, 
as a result of the trial court's decision to refer to the jurors by numbers. The court 
recognized that the use of the numbers was justified because Brown and someone else 
had been threatening witnesses, because Brown had behaved in an unruly manner in 
court, and because Brown had misbehaved in jail in the state hospital where he had been 
held for a competency evaluation prior to trial. See id, 118 P.3d 1273, 1281. The court 
determined it was necessary to reverse the convictions because the trial court failed to 
take adequate precautions to minimize the prejudice to Brown's rights to the presumption 
of innocence and to a fair and impartial jury trial. See id. at 1281. The trial court in 
Brown did not inform the jurors that referring to them by number was normal, but instead 
told them that the procedure was being used to ameliorate concerns for their safety. The 
court did not instruct the jury that the procedure should not be held against Brown or used 
by the jurors in assessing his guilt or innocence, but instead made comments which, in 
context with testimony presented at trial and comments by the prosecutor, may have 
implicated Brown. Id. at 1282. Because the procedure violated Brown's constitutional 
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rights to an impartial jury trial and to the presumption of innocence, the court held the 
government to its burden to prove the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), and concluded that despite direct and 
circumstantial evidence of Brown's guilt, the government could not meet its burden on 
the facts of that case. Brown, 118 P.3d at 1282-84. 
There has never been any claim that Ott posed a danger to any juror or had any 
history of improper conduct toward the judicial process or had misbehaved in court. 
There has never been any claim that he has ties to organized crime families, and there was 
never any claim that the press coverage was extraordinary, or that Ott had friends or 
family members or enemies in Utah who might intimidate, retaliate against or harass his 
jurors. Compare, e.g.. Brown and Thomas, supra. Ott's jurors were not in any danger 
from him or his family, and there was no basis for referring to them by number, in 
violation of Rule 18, even under the decisions from those states which permit anonymous 
jury procedures. See, e.g., Thomas, supra. 
Assuming arguendo that Utah judges have the authority to impanel anonymous 
juries when required, but see Utah R. Crim. P. 18, supra, trial counsel never asked the 
court to weigh any purported danger to the jury against the prejudice to Ott's rights to a 
fair trial and the presumption of innocence. But see, e ^ , Brown and Thomas, supra. 
Trial counsel never requested that the court make findings or identify a basis for 
impaneling of an anonymous jury in Mr. Ott's case. The trial lawyers never asked the 
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court to limit the prejudice to Ott's rights. They sought no instructions that juror 
anonymity was standard practice, that the court was trying to protect them from the press 
or anyone other than Ott, or to refrain from drawing adverse inferences about Ott from the 
unusual process of referring to the jurors by numbers. But see, e.g.. Brown, and Thomas, 
supra}1 The use of an anonymous jury in this capital case violated Ott's rights to the 
presumption of innocence and to a fair and impartial jury trial. Compare Brown, supra. 
Trial counsel's failure to timely object and assert Ott's key constitutional rights 
constituted objectively deficient performance. See, ABA Guidelines 10.10.2 and 10.8 for 
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases. Guideline 
10.10.2 requires capital defense counsel to research legal challenges and to object to 
improper jury selection procedures, and to seek expert assistance injury selection. See id. 
Guideline 10.8 requires capital defense counsel to assert and preserve the client's legal 
claims. Anonymous jury procedures are very unusual in this state, and research on the 
topic demonstrating that those measures were unnecessary and prejudicial here from other 
jurisdictions is readily available. See, e.g.. Brown and Thomas, supra. Trial counsel's 
failure to object is properly recognized as failure to prepare and to assert the client's 
rights, and cannot be explained as a reasonable tactical choice, because it can never be in 
the client's best interest to undercut the client's presumption of innocence and to inflame 
17As noted above, the court did inform the jurors that the number system would be 
used to protect their privacy and to encourage candid responses (R. 1371:7-8). 
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the jurors personally against the client. Cf. Fisher v. Gibson. 282 F.3d 1283, 1307 (10th 
Cir. 2002). 
The record establishes a reasonable likelihood of a different result absent the 
anonymous jury procedures. The decision to impose a sentence of life without parole is 
even more amorphous than the decision to impose death - in Utah, the sentence of life 
without parole turns on whether the jury finds the sentence "appropriate." See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-207(5)(c). 
Ott's crimes were a radical departure from his law-abiding life, and were greatly 
mitigated by the historical facts of this case, which show that, despite his very difficult 
upbringing and physical and mental challenges, Ott was a very hardworking provider who 
was trying to keep his family together, and who snapped as a result of his improperly 
medicated bipolar condition, compounded by his post-traumatic stress disorder, and brain 
damage, after he was thrown out of his house and his wife began a romance with another 
man in front of his children in his house. There was no proof of premeditation to kill 
Lacey Lawrence - he did not even know she was in the house when he set the fire. 
See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Had the jurors not been tainted from the outset by the anonymous jury 
proceedings, there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one more of them would have 
voted for the possibility of parole. Trial counsel's performance was thus both objectively 
deficient and prejudicial. 
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Caine's failure to object to the highly unusual anonymous jury procedures, and 
failure to seek to mitigate the inherent prejudice to Ott stemming from the procedures, 
again demonstrates that Caine was not advocating his client's position, but was once 
again acceding to and thereby serving the position of the prosecutor. See Brown, supra 
(recognizing that anonymous jurors routinely infer that the defendant poses a personal 
threat to them). The actual conflict of interest requires reversal of Ott's sentence without 
regard to standard prejudice analysis. See Cuyler, supra. 
E. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE 
As is detailed above, aside from establishing the details of the crimes, the vast 
majority of the prosecution's penalty phase case focused on the victims of Ott's crimes, 
the profound and unique pain each of them suffered, and their opinions as to the 
punishment Ott should face. Prior to trial, the prosecution provided notice to the defense 
that it intended to introduce the "Meet Lacey Lawrence" videotape (R. 1141), and the 
defense never objected to this or any of the other highly moving victim impact evidence. 
Review of law that was readily available at the time of trial confirms that trial 
counsel's failure to object to the admission of the videotape and other victim evidence 
was objectively deficient and prejudicial. 
While Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 purports to allow for the admission of victim 
impact evidence in capital penalty phase trials, unduly prejudicial victim impact evidence 
is barred by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, Payne v. 
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Tennessee. 501 U.S. 808 (1991) at 825 (citing Darden v. Wainwright 477 U.S. 168,179-
83 (1986) for this proposition); at 831 (concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by 
Justices White and Kennedy) (unduly inflammatory victim impact evidence should be 
excluded under the Due Process Clause); at 836 (concurring opinion of Justice Souter, 
joined by Justice Kennedy) (recognizing that victim impact evidence and argument may 
"risk a verdict impermissibly based on passion, not deliberation," and noting that Due 
Process Clause provides a remedy for such verdicts). The Eighth Amendment bans 
family members' opinions and characterizations of the crime, the defendant, and the 
appropriate sentence to be imposed. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 829 n.2 
(1991), and at 33 (concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and 
Kennedy), and at 835 (concurring opinion of justice Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy). 
The reasons for excluding victim evidence have already been fully explained 
in State v. Carter. 888 P.2d 629 (Utah), cert denied. 516 U.S. 858 (1995). There, despite 
the facts that the evidence at issue did not violate the Eighth Amendment standards of 
Payne, see Carter at 650-51 and accompanying notes, and that the rules of evidence are 
not binding in capital penalty phase trials, Carter at 651, this Court expressly noted that 
the admissibility of victim impact evidence had yet to be addressed under the Utah 
Constitution, Carter at 650 n.34, and utilized the rules of evidence as a guide to explain 
why impact evidence is largely inadmissible in Utah penalty trials. The Court first noted 
that under the capital sentencing statute, 76-3-207, evidence must be relevant, must have 
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probative force, and must not be unduly prejudicial to be admissible in capital sentencing 
proceedings. Carter at 651 and n.36. The Court then turned to Utah R. Evid. 401, which 
defines relevant evidence in broad terms - "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." See id. The Court 
recognized that in the context of a capital sentencing hearing, victim impact evidence is 
not relevant to the defendant's blameworthiness or the sentence he should receive. 
Carter, 888 P.2d at 652. The Court explained that the proper focus of a capital penalty 
phase is the defendant, and his character and history, and that victim impact evidence 
shifts the focus away from this to the victim and the influence of the victim's death on the 
victim's family and the community. Carter at 652. The Court recognized that this 
evidence does not bear on the defendant's culpability and is "fraught with danger," 
because it not only distracts the jury from its proper focus, but also effectively suggests 
that "some victims are more valuable to society and/or deserve more sympathy than 
others" and may lead the capital sentencers to empathize with the victim's family's 
tragedy, dangerously increasing the possibility of "improper passion or prejudice." Id. at 
652. 
The Carter Court found that victim impact evidence has "no probative force" 
because all humans are equally valuable, and sentencers should not be tempted to punish 
a defendant more or less severely based on the extent to which a crime victim's family is 
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influenced and esteems the victim. Id. Moreover, if the victim's worth is the focus of a 
sentencing hearing, the defense might be inclined or feel obligated to present evidence 
denigrating the victim, further diverting the sentencing process from its proper focus. Id. 
The Court held that victim impact evidence, including evidence of the victim's character, 
evidence of the impact of the crime on the victim's family, and evidence of the victim's 
family member's opinions of the crime are inadmissible, and characterized this holding as 
a guideline to channel the capital sentencer's discretion. Id. at 653. 
The Carter Court recognized that some victim impact evidence will come in 
incidentally during the course of a trial, particularly when it is key to critical issues such 
as self defense and the character of the victim, and recognized that this is permissible in 
both the guilt and penalty phases. Id. at 653 n.37. 
While Carter was written before § 76-3-207 was amended to permit the admission 
of victim impact evidence, its rationale is still fully true and applicable, and should have 
been asserted by trial counsel. 
More recently, in State v. KelL 2002 UT 106, 61 P.3d 1019, the Court did not 
reach Kell's state and federal constitutional challenges to the amendment to 76-3-207, 
which allow for the admission of victim impact evidence, because the admission of victim 
impact evidence was harmless in Kell's case. However, the Court did cite with approval 
State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164 (N.J. 1996), for its standards, which carefully 
circumscribe the admission of this evidence so that unduly prejudicial victim impact 
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evidence is not admitted. Kell at Tf 53 n.17. Trial counsel should have asserted this as 
well, to combat the prosecution's most compelling but improper aggravating evidence. 
Trial counsel should have argued that the amendment to 76-3-207 should be read 
to conform to footnote 37 of Carter, to permit the admission of incidental victim impact 
evidence and victim impact evidence which is key to material issues. See id. 
Trial counsel should have argued that the statute should be read to conform to 
federal constitutional standards, which prohibit unduly prejudicial victim impact 
evidence, and which forbid victims' family members from opining on punishment, the 
defendant and the crime. See, e^g., Payne and Darden, supra. 
Trial counsel should have argued that the statute should also be read to conform to 
numerous provisions of the Utah Constitution, which would prohibit the admission of 
unnecessary victim impact evidence. Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution has been 
interpreted as requiring exclusion of unreliable evidence which is likely to mislead a jury, 
see State v. Ramirez. 817 P2.d 774 (Utah 1991), and as requiring an inquiry into the 
merits of the case to be adjudicated, see generally Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 
317 (Utah 1945). Because unnecessary victim impact evidence is not relevant to the real 
issues to be adjudicated in a capital sentencing proceeding, and is likely to distract and 
prejudice capital sentencers, see Carter, supra, it should be excluded under Article I § 7. 
See Ramirez; Christiansen, supra. 
Article I § 9 prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and unnecessarily rigorous 
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treatment of inmates, and is interpreted as requiring inquiry into the specific facts and 
circumstances of each case. See State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 267 (Utah 1986). 
Excluding victim impact evidence from the sentencing phases of capital cases would be 
in order under this provision, given that the admission fo such evidence risks the arbitrary 
and capricious entry of capital sentences on the bases of factors which are not proper to 
the proper inquiry in a capital penalty phase. See Carter, supra. 
Article I § 12 provides the general procedural and substantive rights of criminal 
defendants to insure the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. See generally. State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). A rule excluding from capital sentencing 
proceedings distracting and prejudicial victim impact evidence would certainly comport 
with the general thrust of this provision. See Carter, supra. 
Article I § 24, the Uniform Operation of Laws provision, and Article VI § 26, the 
proscription against special laws, would also support exclusion of victim impact 
evidence, because reliance on such evidence undermines proportionality in capital 
sentencing proceedings, rendering defendants subject to the ultimate penalty on the basis 
of random evidence regarding personal characteristics of the victims, rather than on the 
basis of the defendants' personal culpability and character. See generally Greenwood v. 
City of Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 821 (Utah 1991) ("Article I, section 234 requires that a 
law must apply equally to all persons within a class and that statutory classifications must 
have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute."); Blue Cross & Blue 
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Shield of Utah v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989) (discussing Article I § 24 and 
indicating that Article VI § 26 is generally viewed as the "flip side" of Article I § 24). 
The fact that the Utah Constitution has such comprehensive coverage of the rights 
involved confirms the propriety of excluding evidence leading to unequal application of 
the death penalty on the basis of the Utah Constitution. 
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all 
issues in the lower court. See, e.g.. State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at j^ 10, 67 P.3d 
1005. When a defense lawyer fails to assert beneficial, current law, this constitutes 
objectively deficient performance, which will not be excused by this Court with 
hypothetical tactical bases. See, State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App. 1989) 
(trial counsel's failure to seek jury instruction reflecting current law beneficial to the 
client was objectively deficient oversight of the law, which could not conceivably have 
been valid trial strategy). See also ABA Guideline 10.8 (explaining the duty to assert and 
preserve all legal claims). 
Given the Court's decisions in Carter and Kell, and the governing federal law, 
such as Darden and Payne, counsel should have objected to the admission of so much 
powerful victim impact evidence. Like every member of the Utah bar, trial counsel are 
sworn to uphold the Utah Constitution, and should have developed the foregoing 
authorities into a state constitutional argument to limit the vast and powerful victim 
impact evidence in the government's case against Ott. See Smedlev, Moritzky and ABA 
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Guideline 10.8, supra. 
Trial counsel's failures with regard to the victim impact evidence were not and 
cannot be viewed as reasonable trial strategy. See, e.g., Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 
1307 (10th Cir. 2002). In Fisher, the court conditionally reversed a capital conviction and 
death sentence after holding that trial counsel's trial performance in, inter alia, bolstering 
the State's case, and failing to present a defense theory and hold prosecution to its burden 
of proof, was objectively deficient and prejudicial in context of a weak government case. 
The court succinctly rejected the theory that defense counsel's omissions and 
commissions amounted to valid trial strategy, stating: 
Where an attorney accidentally brings out testimony that is damaging 
because he has failed to prepare, his conduct cannot be called a strategic 
choice: an event produced by the happenstance of counsel's uninformed and 
reckless cross-examination cannot be called a "choice11 at all. 
Id. at 1296. The court reviewed the overall performance of the lawyer, including 
instances of adequate performance and inadequate performance, and concluded that the 
record did not honestly reflect a coherent trial strategy, but reflected a lack of preparation 
and diligence which undermined the necessary functioning of the adversary system. Id. at 
1296-1307. 
Likewise here, trial counsel's failures to object to the victim impact evidence were 
not conceivably reasonably strategic, but were highly prejudicial instances of failure to 
prepare for trial and assert Ott's rights, which resulted in a failure of our adversary 
system. See Fisher, supra. 
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Ott's crimes were a radical departure from his law-abiding life, and were greatly 
mitigated by the historical facts of this case, which show that, despite his very difficult 
upbringing and physical and mental challenges, he was a very hardworking provider who 
was trying to keep his family together, and who snapped as a result of his improperly 
medicated bipolar condition, compounded by his Gulf War Syndrome, PTSD, and brain 
damage, after he was thrown out of his house and his wife began a romance with another 
man in front of his children in his house. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
The "Meet Lacey Lawrence" videotape and the testimony of her family regarding 
their profound grief was some of the most moving evidence presented in the trial court. 
When her family members and the other survivors of Ott's crimes detailed their injuries, 
trauma and grief, and then voiced their opinions that Ott should receive a sentence of life 
without parole, the jurors were undoubtedly left feeling obligated to give these people 
what they were asking for. Had the jurors not been exposed to the highly prejudicial 
victim impact evidence, there is a reasonable likelihood that at least one of the ten who 
voted for life without parole might have recognized the substantial time Ott will 
necessarily serve as a result of his multiple convictions, and might have thought it 
worthwhile and constructive to at least hold out the hope of parole someday years down 
the road. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (reversing capital sentence for 
ineffective assistance after concluding that if the defense case had been handled 
competently, there was "a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck 
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a different balance."). Ott has thus established ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. 
The failure of trial counsel to assert Ott's rights in this instance cannot be justified 
as any reasonable strategy on his behalf, and is one of the clearest examples of the poor or 
non-representation Ott received as a result of Caine's representation of, co-counseling 
and friendship with the prosecutor. This justifies reversal of the sentences even if Ott 
could not show prejudice. See Lovell, supra. 
F. FAILURE TO PROTECT THE RECORD 
During the penalty phase, the defense agreed that, other than the tapes of Ott 
threatening Donna over the phone, none of the recordings presented to the jurors would 
be placed in evidence (R. 1377: 7). Thus, the jurors saw the six minute videotape, "Meet 
Lacey Lawrence," and the videotape of Ott fishing with his children and being 
interviewed on his way to the Gulf War, and heard the audiotapes of Ott crying at his first 
extradition hearing when he learned someone died, and then sobbing at his second 
extradition when he learned that a six-year-old daughter died, but these recordings were 
not placed in evidence, because trial counsel stipulated to keeping them out (R. 1377: 7). 
It was objectively deficient for trial counsel to withhold from evidence the 
recordings played for the jury (the six minute videotape, "Meet Lacey Lawrence," the 
videotapes of Ott fishing with his children and being interviewed on his way to the Gulf 
War, and the audiotapes of Ott crying at his first extradition hearing when he learned 
someone died, and then sobbing at his second extradition when he learned that a six-year-
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old daughter died (R. 1377: 7). It was likewise objectively deficient to present the 
defense mitigation case on a Power Point presentation that was not placed in the record 
and cannot be located. 
This is so because trial lawyers in capital cases have the obligation to protect the 
record so that it is fully available for review of the state and federal appellate courts. See 
ABA Guideline 10.7(B)(2) and 10.8(B)(2) (requiring capital lawyers to insure that the 
record is complete and supplement it when necessary); Strickland, supra (requiring courts 
to assess prejudice on the basis of the entire evidentiary picture). 
Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees Mr. Ott an appeal of right from 
his capital and other convictions. See id. Accordingly, he is entitled to effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. E.g.. Evitts v. Lucev. 469 U.S. 387. 391-97 (1985). A 
complete record is essential to effective assistance, for if the record is incomplete, the 
courts may disregard issues, regardless of their merit. See, e.g.. Horton v. Green Mut.. 
794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1990). An adequate record of proceedings is mandated by 
due process of law, guaranteed by Article I § 7 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, particularly because this is a capital case. See. Christiansen v. 
Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 316-17 (Utah 1945). Article VIII § 1 of the Conslitution of Utah 
provides for the creation of numerous courts of record in this state, and Utah Code Ann. § 
78-1-1(2) designates district courts, such as presided over Ott's capital prosecution, as 
courts of record. These provisions of law confirm the fundamental importance of having 
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a thorough record in this capital case for Ott's appeal. See, e.g., Olson v. Park-Craig 
Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Utah App. 1991)(detailing the law requiring courts of 
record to maintain a thorough record of proceedings). 
In the event that the record is incomplete, and the reviewing courts do not reach 
the merits of Ott's claims, this would defeat Ott's rights to appeal and to due process, 
discussed above. It would also violate his rights of access to the courts. Constitution of 
Utah, Article I § 11, the open courts provision, which expressly recognizes the right of 
access to the courts. "The clear language [of this provision] guarantees access to the 
courts and a judicial procedure that is based on fairness and equality." Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985). Under this provision, courts are to 
"resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a 
controversy." Carman v. Slavens, 546 P.2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976). "At a minimum, a day 
in court means each party shall be afforded the opportunity to present claims and 
defenses, and have them adjudicated on the merits according to the facts and the law." 
Miller v.USAACas. Ins. Co., 44 P.3d 663, 674-75 (Utah 2002). 
The federal constitution likewise guarantees a right of access to the courts. 
See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-828 (1977) {plurality) (Fourteenth Amendment 
requires states to provide defendants meaningful access to courts to enable them to 
challenge violations of the fundamental federal constitutional rights in post-conviction). 
Ott's rights to access to the courts require a thorough record for the appeal, because if the 
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record is incomplete, the courts ay not reach the merits of the appeal and he will not have 
his day in court. But see, e.g.. Miller, supra. The foregoing authorities establish the 
objective deficiency of counsel's failure to insist on a complete record. 
While the Attorney General's office has stipulated to supplementation of the 
record, trial counsel's choice to exclude the recordings from the record was prejudicial 
because the power point presentation of the defense case in the penalty phase cannot be 
located, and because the parties cannot recall which part of the fishing videotape was 
played for the jury. The incomplete nature of the record is prejudicial because this 
forecloses accurate assessment of errors to be discussed on appeal in the context of the 
full evidentiary picture presented to the jury. Thus, Ott has met his burden to prove his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland, supra. 
Assuming that the record were complete or could be completed, trial counsel's 
repeated failures to protect the record are perhaps the clearest examples of trial counsel's 
making choices and taking actions that diverged from Ott's best interests, which cannot 
be attributed to any reasonable strategic decision. The videotapes of Ott as a young 
soldier and as a father fishing with his children are some of the most humanizing pieces 
of evidence that the jurors saw. The audiotapes of Ott's extradition hearings capture Ott's 
shock and grief at learning that he had killed someone, and then learning that he had 
killed the six-year-old Lacey Lawrence. They record the presiding judge's efforts to 
communicate with Ott, and the judge's recognition that Ott was not tracking mentally 
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during the hearings. Ott's remorse is sincere, spontaneous and palpable in these 
recordings. 
This Court ought to watch the "Meet Lacey Lawrence" videotape and then 
consider why Caine did not object to it being played for the jurors despite having received 
notice before the hearing of Wilson's intention to play it (Rl 141). The Court should then 
consider why Caine stipulated to keeping the tape out of the record on appeal. The only 
reasonable explanation for this course of conduct is that he was laboring under a conflict 
of interest as a result of his friendship with, representation of and acting as co-counsel 
with Ott's prosecutor in this capital case. This requires reversal of Ott's sentences. See, 
e.g., Cuyler, Lovell supra. 
G. FAILURE TO PROPERLY CHALLENGE THE LIFE 
WITHOUT PAROLE STATUTE 
On April 30, 2004, Caine filed a motion to arrest judgment challenging life 
without parole statute (R. 1205-1215). The motion was filed late and with very little 
authority. The court denied the motion to arrest judgment, essentially finding the issues 
waived (R. 1284-1289). Law that was readily available at the time of trial confirms that 
the life without parole statute is unconstitutional, and should have been properly 
challenged by trial counsel. 
The life without parole statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207, purports to create a 
class of murders for which a person may be sentenced to life without the possibility of 
parole. See id. This statute violates the plain language of Article VII § 12 of the Utah 
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Constitution, which grants the Utah Board of Pardons the authority to "grant parole . . . in 
all cases except treason and impeachmentsf.]" 
Utah courts routinely give effect to the plain language of the Utah Constitution, 
and recognize that while the legislature may enact laws to implement constitutional 
provisions, the legislature does not have authority to enact laws which conflict with the 
plain language of the constitution.18 Thus, while the Legislature has the constitutional 
authority expressly granted by Article VII § 12 to enact laws regarding the conditions for 
the granting of parole, it does not have authority to change or augment the 
constitutionally-specified list of crimes for which no parole may be granted. See id. 
Because the constitutional provision specifies the two instances in which the Board of 
Pardons may not grant parole, cases of treason or impeachments, this Court should 
recognize in accordance with the plain language of Article VII § 12 that the Board is 
constitutionally empowered to grant parole for all other offenses.19 Because the life 
without parole statute constitutes both a legislative and judicial usurpation of the Board of 
18See, og,, Grand County v. Emery County. 2002 UT 57, H 27-29, 52 P.3d 1148 
(giving effect to the plain language of Article Xl^ f 3 of the Utah Constitution, and noting that 
while the Legislature was authorized to set the conditions for annexation, it had no authority 
to modify the voting requirement appearing in the plain language of the Utah Constitution). 
19See, e ^ , Field v. Bover Co.. L.C.. 952 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1998) (recognizing the 
maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius? which means the 
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another); Hansen v. Wilkinson, 658 P.2d 
1216, 1217 (Utah 1983) ("It probably is not wholly inaccurate to suppose that ordinarily 
when people say one thing they do not mean something else.") (quoting 2a C. Sands, 
Sutherland Statutory Construction, §47.01 (4th ed. 1973)). 
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Pardons' constitutional parole power, see Constitution of Utah Article VII § 12, the 
statute violates the separation of powers doctrine embodied in Article V § 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, which forbids legislative and judicial branch actors from exercising the 
powers and functions belonging to those of executive branch actors. A three part inquiry 
controls the application of Article V § 1, as follows: 
First, are the [actors] in question "charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to" one of the three branches of government? Second, is 
the function that the statute has given the [actors] one "appertaining to" 
another branch of government? The third and final step in the analysis asks: 
if the answer to both of the above questions is "yes," does the constitution 
"expressly" direct or permit exercise of the otherwise forbidden function? If 
not, article V, section 1 is transgressed. 
Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons. 2004 UT 53, ^[23, 94 P.3d 283 (quoting In re Young, 
1999UT6,TJ8,976P.2d581). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (5) not only constitutes a legislative denial of parole in 
capital cases, but also contemplates that courts will impose a sentence of life without 
parole, thus exercising a power which belongs to one branch of government. The 
function § 76-3-207(5) grants to the Legislature and the courts, the denial of parole, is one 
appertaining to another branch of government - the Board of Pardons of the executive 
branch.20 Because the constitution does not expressly direct or permit the Legislature or 
the courts to deny parole in sentencing, § 76-3-207 transgresses Article V § 1. See Jones, 
20
 See Constitution of Utah, Article VII § 12, supra; Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons, 
2004 UT 53,ffl[ 26-27, 94 P.3d 283 (recognizing the Board of Pardons as an Executive 
Branch "person" subject to Article V § 1). 
101 
supra. 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees due process of law, as does 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Doctrines of procedural 
and substantive due process call for legislation that is sufficiently specific to give notice 
of proscribed behavior. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987); In re Bover. 
636 P.2d 1085, 1087-1088 (Utah 1981). The vagueness doctrine is designed to insure 
that citizens have notice of the legal consequences of their actions, and 1o insure that 
legislative policy determinations are not delegated to those who are to enforce and apply 
the laws. See. Gravned v. Rockford 408 U.S. 104, 108-09(1972). The vagueness 
doctrine is particularly focused on legislative responsibility to define criminal standards, 
because our nation values the freedom of our citizens, and seeks to prevent executive and 
judicial branch actors from having excessive discretion to discriminate in the enforcement 
and application of the laws. Kolender v Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). 
The life without parole statute is vague as applied to Ott, because he had no way to 
predict whether his capital sentencers would find it "appropriate" for him to receive the 
drastic sentence of life without parole, given the absence of any legislative guidance to 
salvage the statute from wholly subjective application. But see Kolender, supra. 
In addition to the general due process guarantees mentioned above, the Utah 
Constitution requires the legislature to define the criminal law, vesting the lawmaking 
power in the legislative branch of our state government. See Constitution of Utah, Article 
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VI §1 . 
Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution mandates separation of government 
powers. This constitutional provision recognizes the critical balance of the branches of 
our government, which requires the legislature to write specific laws, rather than enacting 
vague laws explicitly or implicitly delegating to police, prosecutors and judges the 
responsibility to define the laws.21 
The life without parole sentencing statute effectively delegates the responsibility to 
define the criminal law to the capital sentencer, who elects that extreme sentence solely 
on a finding of appropriateness, which is necessarily wholly left to the subjective opinion 
of the capital sentencer, given the complete absence of any legislative guidance. Because 
the statute fails to set forth any standard of proof or criteria for capital sentencers to use in 
deciding whether to impose the drastic sentence of life without parole, or the lesser 
sentence of twenty years to life, the legislature has failed to fulfill its duty of drafting 
clear legislation, and has delegated that duty to the judges and juries. But see, e.g.. 
21See State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912 (Utah App.)(statute explicitly delegating to U.S. 
Attorney authority to define elements and punishment of crimes under controlled substances 
act violated non-delegation doctrine of Article VI section 1 of Utah Constitution), cert, 
denied, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (Utah 1990); State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 
1977)(statute explicitly delegating to Utah Attorney General authority to define elements and 
punishment of crimes under controlled substances act violated Article V, section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution). See also State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321,1324 (Utah 1986)(Howe, J., 
concurring)(mIt would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough 
to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to courts to step inside and say who could be 
rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute 
the judicial for the legislative department of the government.m)(citation omitted). 
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Kolendar, Green, Gallion, and Grayned, supra. 
In Utah, a person convicted of a capital offense may be sentenced to life without 
parole if ten members of the jury find the sentence "appropriate," 76-3-207(5)(c), or if the 
person is under a sentence of death when the death penalty is stricken as unconstitutional 
after April 27, 1992, 76-3-207 (7)(a), or if an appellate court reverses a death sentence as 
a result of the person's mental retardation or sub-average intellectual functioning, 76-3-
207(8)(a), or if an appellate court reverses a death sentence as a result of the person's 
mental retardation or sub-average intellectual functioning, determines that life without 
parole might be a manifestly unjust sentence, and remands the matter to the trial court for 
sentencing proceedings which result in a sentence of life without parole, 76-3-207(8) (b). 
A person convicted of a capital offense may receive a sentence of twenty years to life if 
ten members of the jury do not find a sentence of life without parole appropriate, 76-3-
207(5)(c), if the person is convicted of a capital offense after the death penalty is stricken 
as unconstitutional if this occurs after April 27, 1992, 76-3-207(7)(a), or if an appellate 
court reverses a death sentence as a result of the person's mental retardation or sub-
average intellectual functioning, determines that life without parole might be a manifestly 
unjust sentence, and remands the matter to the trial court for sentencing proceedings 
which result in a sentence of twenty years to life, 76-3-207(8)(a) and (b). 
Because the statute repeatedly classifies between those defendants who are eligible 
for parole and those who are not, without any rational basis, the statute violates principles 
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of equal protection and uniform operation of laws.22 Reference to State v. Moht 901 P.2d 
991, 997 (Utah 1995), confirms that the statute provides the capital sentencers and judges 
unconstitutional discretion under the uniform operation of laws provision, Article I § 24 
of the Utah Constitution. In striking the juvenile direct filing provision in Mohu the 
Court described the unique application of the state constitutional provision, stating, "[F]or 
a law to be constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that it be uniform on its 
face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate 
uniformly if'persons similarly situated1 are not 'treated similarly.'" Id. at 997 (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted, some brackets by the Court). Courts applying the 
uniform operation of laws provision are to identify statutory classifications, determine 
whether classes of people subject to the statute are treated in disparate fashion, and then 
assess whether the disparate treatment is justified by a reasonable legislative objective. Id. 
Applying in the context of the life without parole statute the analysis set forth in 
Mohi confirms that the statute violates the uniform operation of laws provision of the 
Utah Constitution. The statute makes classifications which result in people being treated 
in radically disparate fashion - the statute classifies those defendants who are eligible for 
parole and those who must live the remainder of their natural lives in prison. There is no 
22See, e ^ , Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center. 2002 UT 134 ffif 33-34, 67 
P.3d 436 (recognizing that state constitution requires that all laws apply uniformly to 
similarly situated people, and that the federal constitution requires laws to apply in similar 
fashion to similarly situated individuals). 
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rational basis for, or reasonable statutory end served by, the disparate treatment of the two 
classes. Neither this statute nor any other sets forth any criteria or standard of proof for 
judges or jurors to apply in assessing whether it is "appropriate" to sentence someone to 
life without parole or to the lesser sentence of twenty years to life, and neither this statute 
nor any other explains why those people with death sentences pending when the death 
penalty is stricken as unconstitutional are ineligible for a sentence of twenty years to life, 
whereas those convicted of capital offenses after the death penalty is stricken as 
unconstitutional may receive the lesser sentence of twenty years to life. 
Because there are no statutory standards to guide the capital sentencers' discretion, 
see subsections (5) and (8), and because the statute itself classifies irrationally between 
those who are eligible for parole or not if the death penalty is stricken as unconstitutional, 
subsection (7), similarly situated defendants may well be classified and treated in widely 
disparate fashions, without any legislative consideration of or justification for the 
disparity. But see, Mohi, and Wood, supra. 
While there might be a legitimate need to sentence some capital defendants more 
harshly than others, the statutory scheme does not specify in any way how capital 
sentencers are to determine which defendants receive the drastic life without parole 
sentence, and thus permits sentences to turn on improper factors. Cf. Mohi at 1002 
(excessive prosecutorial discretion permits prosecutors to discriminate against unpopular 
groups of people). As the Utah Constitution recognizes, the decision of when an inmate 
should be paroled is not one which is properly made at the time of sentencing, but rather, 
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is one which should be left to the expertise of the Board of Pardons, after the inmates' 
institutional history provides the information essential to making a non-speculative 
assessment of the inmate's rehabilitation and likelihood of recidivism. See Constitution 
of Utah, Article VII § 12, supra. 
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and is considered a necessary 
component of any valid jury verdict under the Sixth Amendment. See, e^g., State v. 
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 11, 116 P.3d 305. The Due Process Clause in Article I § 7 of the 
Utah Constitution and § 76-1-501 of the Utah Code require the government to prove each 
element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See, State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 
24, \ 13, 980 P.2d 191. Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution entitles a criminal 
defendant to have a jury find each element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and this rule also applies when sentence enhancements essentially create crimes, or 
enhance sentences for crimes on the basis of additional elements. State v. Lopes J 999 UT 
24,1f 16, 980 P.2d 191.23 Subsection (5) of the life without parole statute violates Article 
I §§ 7 and 12 because it essentially creates a new or higher degree of murder punishable 
23In Lopes, this Court employed the Utah Constitution and federal constitution to 
strike a subsection of the gang enhancement statute which permitted trial judges enhance 
criminal sentences on the basis of findings of elements proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 1999 UT 24, ffljl2-17. While the legislature expressly disavowed the intention to 
create an offense with the sentencing enhancement, the Court looked beyond this stated 
intention, and recognized that the legislature had actually created a new crime, or a crime of 
a higher degree. Id. at f 15. 
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with the higher sentence of life without parole, upon a finding of the appropriateness of 
such a sentence, and does not require appropriateness to be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. But see Lopes, supra. 
Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as interpreted by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000), "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases 
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a 
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 24 See also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 
609 (2002)(aggravating factor essential to death sentence must be found by a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt).25 The statutory maximum is defined for Sixth Amendment purposes 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the defendant was convicted of 
second degree possession of a firearm for unlawful purposes. Id 468-470. That offense 
carried a penalty of up to ten years under state law. Id At the state's urging, the sentencing 
judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's offense had been 
motivated by racial animus. As a result of the finding, the court enhanced the defendant's 
sentence to a twelve year term, which was two years greater than the defendant could have 
received on the original offense absent the finding of racial animus. Id. at 471. On appeal, 
the defendant challenged the sentencing judge's ability to increase the length of his sentence. 
In addressing the defendant's argument, the United States Supreme Court held that 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees, including the Sixth 
Amendment right to a trial by jury, "[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant's 
authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact - no matter how the State 
labels it - must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 482-483. In 
accordance with this constitutionally guaranteed right to a trial by jury, the Apprendi Court 
concluded that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty 
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
25In Ring v.Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,608-609 (2002), the Court held that in accordance 
with the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, a jury, not a judge, must decide whether an 
aggravating circumstance exists for the purpose of imposing the death penalty. In Ring, the 
Court relied on its decision in Apprendi for the proposition that in capital proceedings, the 
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as "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the fact reflected in 
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely v. Washington. 542 U.S. 296, 303 
(2004)(emphasis by the Court).26 
Subsection (5) of the life without parole statute, which permits the extreme 
sentence of life without parole to enter on a finding of appropriateness, is 
unconstitutional, because the statute contemplates an increase beyond the maximum a 
judge could impose (twenty years to life) on the basis of the jury's factual finding 
(appropriateness), which need not be proved or found beyond a reasonable doubt. But see 
enumerated aggravating factors that must be found at the penalty phase in order to justify 
imposition of the death penalty operate as the functional equivalent of a greater offense. 
Specifically, the Court held that "[t]he right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the fact finding necessary 
to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the fact finding necessary to put him 
to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both." Id, at 610. The state had 
argued because the first degree murder statute, under which the defendant was convicted, 
was punishable by death or life imprisonment, the defendant was sentenced within the range 
of punishment authorized by the jury's verdict. Id, at 603-604. The Court disagreed, 
concluding that because an explicit finding of an aggravating factor is necessary before the 
death penalty may be imposed, the finding of such a factor is essentially a finding of a greater 
offense. Id, Accordingly, that fact must be found by a jury. Id. 
26In Blakely, the defendant pled guilty to kidnaping his wife. Id, at 2534. As a result 
of his plea, the maximum sentence the defendant could receive was 53 months. Id. 
However, at the time of sentencing, the court found the defendant acted with deliberate 
cruelty in the commission of the offense, thereby imposing an "exceptional" sentence of 90 
months. Id, The defendant appealed, arguing the court's finding at sentencing deprived him 
of his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable 
doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. Id, The United States Supreme Court 
agreed, concluding that when a judge imposes a sentence not within the scope of the jury's 
verdict alone, the judge exceeds his proper authority. Id, at 2537. Accordingly, the Court 
held that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment constitutional right to require the state to prove 
all facts legally essential to the punishment. Id, 
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Apprendt Blakely, and Ring, supra. Utah's capital sentencing scheme is essentially the 
same as the sentencing scheme analyzed by the Court in Ring.27 Before a jury may 
impose a death sentence in Utah, the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
existence of aggravating factors which outweigh mitigating factors. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-207(5)(b). If a jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict regarding the imposition 
of the death penalty, the jury must then consider whether life without the possibility of 
parole or life with the possibility of parole is an appropriate punishment. Utah Code Ann. 
§76-3-207(5)(c). Because a sentence of life without parole is a harsher punishment than 
life with the possibility of parole, permitting a non-unanimous jury decision for the 
purpose of imposing a sentence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(5)(c) violates a 
defendant's constitutional right to a trial by jury. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Ring, 
536 U.S. at 610; Blakelv. 124 S. Ct. at 2537. As the Ring Court noted, "[t]he right to trial 
by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it 
encompassed the fact finding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, 
but not the fact finding necessary to put him to death." 536 U.S. at 610. Similarly, the 
27
 Arizona Revised Statute section 13-703(E), provides as follows: 
In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment, the 
trier of fact shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances that have been proven. The trier of fact shall impose a sentence 
of death if the trier of fact finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances 
enumerated in subsection F of this section and then determines that there are 
no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. 
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Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury would be significantly diminished if it 
encompassed the fact finding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, 
but not the fact finding necessary to imprison him for the rest of her life. See id- Under 
the Federal Constitution and Utah Constitution, it is important to retain unanimity in the 
capital sentencing context in order to insure the reliability of the outcome.28 
Article I § 10 guarantees the criminal defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict 
as to each element of all criminal offenses.29 This Court considered the constitutionality 
of permitting a non-unanimous jury to impose a life without parole sentence in State v. 
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, 40 P.3d 611. In Daniels, the defendant argued that juror unanimity is 
required under Utah Const, art. I, § 10, which provides: "In criminal cases, the verdict 
28In Williams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Court ruled that the common law 
requirement of a 12 person jury was not necessarily incorporated into the Sixth Amendment 
jury requirement under the federal constitution. The Court reasoned that the number 
requirement was not "an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment" and, 
accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to a 12-person jury. The Court distinguished the 
common law unanimity requirement from the number requirement, leaving open the 
possibility that the defendant has a right to a unanimous jury. "While much of the above 
historical discussion applies as well to the unanimity as to the 12-man requirement, the 
former, unlike the latter, may well serve an important role in the jury function, for example, 
as a device for insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of proof' IdL, at 100, 
n. 46 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that the number requirement was not an 
essential component of the Sixth Amendment, because the unanimity requirement is retained. 
Id, at 100-01. Cf. State v. Steele. 921 So.2d 538, 549 (Fla. 2006) (discussing cases and a 
study concluding that juries which are required to reach unanimous verdicts reach more 
reliable and well reasoned verdicts). 
29See. State v. Saunders. 1999 UT 59 If 61, 992 P.2d 951, 967 (reversing conviction 
under Article I § 10 for absence of unanimity instruction in a case wherein the jurors may 
have convicted defendant on different factual theories, indicating that unanimity is necessary 
as to each element of an offense). 
I l l 
shall be unanimous." (Emphasis added.) In rejecting this argument, the Court 
determined that the language of art. I, § 10 specifically limits itself to the guilt phase of a 
criminal trial by the use of the term verdict because the term "verdict" has no applicability 
at sentencing. Trial counsel should have raised the issue before the trial court to preserve 
it for this Court to reconsider Daniels in light of Lopes, Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely, 
supra. As the Court recognized in Lopes, although the legislature might expressly intend 
to create a sentencing enhancement statute, and might expressly require the findings 
essential to such an enhancement to be made in a sentencing proceeding, when the 
legislature creates a class of crimes subject to uniquely higher punishments based on 
proof and finding of elements, such crimes are properly recognized as such by the courts, 
and criminal defendants should enjoy the standard procedural benefits such as proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See id, supra. In the context of the life without parole 
statute, because the legislature has created a class of murders which is uniquely 
punishable with the sentence of life without parole, and requires a finding of 
appropriateness, the jury's determination is properly considered a verdict, which should 
be found by a unanimous jury. Cf. Lopes, supra. 
The ABA Guidelines require appointed capital lawyers to research and investigate 
all potential defenses, assert all legal claims on behalf of their clients, and to fully and 
accurately inform the clients of the ramifications and legal issues involved in their plea 
negotiations and to let the client make an informed choice regarding plea bargaining. 
See, e.g., ABA Guidelines 10.8, 10.9.1 and 10.9.2. Trial counsel thus should have fully 
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researched the life without parole statute before he ever pled Ott guilty to capital murder 
and thereby qualified him to be sentenced under that law. See id. Particularly given the 
well-established nature of the law regarding the unconstitutionality of the statute under 
which Ott was sentenced to life in prison without parole, trial counsel's failure to assert 
this law in timely fashion on Ott's behalf was both objectively deficient and prejudicial. 
See Moritzky, supra. Given Ott's efforts to withdraw his plea, and given that he is 
currently serving life without parole on the basis of this unconstitutional law, counsel's 
performance was prejudicial. 
The fact that the issue was raised haphazardly after the trial was over again points 
to Caine's failure to zealously represent Ott as a result of Caine's improper relationship 
with the prosecutor, requiring reversal even if prejudice were not shown. See Cuyler, 
Lovell supra. 
III. THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, PLAIN ERROR 
AND CUMULATIVE ERROR DOCTRINES REQUIRE 
REVERSAL OF OTT'S CONVICTIONS AND 
SENTENCES. 
When issues are not properly preserved by trial lawyers, courts utilize the 
exceptional circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare procedural anomalies,'" as a 
'"safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v. Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, f^ 
23,94P.3dl86. 
To overcome waiver, the plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious 
and harmful error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although 
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the obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is 
more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Under the cumulative error doctrine, the Court will consider all errors, both 
identified and assumed by the Court to have occurred, and will reverse if'"the cumulative 
effect of the several errors undermines [the Court's] confidence . . . that a fair trial was 
had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). 
Several of the errors which occurred in this case should have been obvious to the 
trial court. The facts known to the trial court regarding Ott's incompetence, detailed 
above,30 gave rise to a duty for the court to require a thorough competency evaluation of 
30The competency petition alleged: 
(a) A history of mental instability that apparently has included two or 
three suicide attempts, self inflicted wounds, the necessity of maintaining 
prescriptions of severe mood altering medications such as paxil and xanax, 
recent findings by the Department of Human Services relating to the 
behavior of the defendant, and that the defendant was placed on suicide 
watch for three weeks immediately following his incarceration. 
(b) A request from Dr. Drury from McKay Dee Hospital on or about 
August 6, 2002, that a "complete mental evaluation" be completed on the 
defendant. 
(R. 39-45). One of the evaluations which concluded that Ott was competent actually 
contained many assertions which point to incompetence. It stated: 
Mr. Ott's characteristics also make it difficult for him to participate 
consistently in a legal proceeding in representing himself. By traditional 
standards of assessment, he is competent to stand trial. However, given his 
obsessiveness, reactivity, volatility and paranoia, he is at significant risk to 
make poor judgments or act in contradiction to the required course of the 
proceedings. Depending upon the circumstance an the course and flow of 
events, he is likely to be able to perform under conditions that are not 
particularly confrontive or stressful but is likely to lose control relatively 
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Ott sua sponte under well-established federal and state law. See, e^*., Drope v, Missouri, 
420 U.S. 152, 178-82 (1975) (defendant's suicide attempt and irrational pretrial behavior 
raised competency issue, and trial court's failure to inquire into competency violated due 
process of law); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1966) (due process required 
competency evaluation when defendant attempted suicide and was previously confined as 
a psychopath); State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1 f 49, 63 P.3d 731 (requiring sua sponte 
competency evaluation when there is a "substantial question of possible doubt" regarding 
competency); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4 (recognizing the trial courts' authority to raise 
the issue of competency any time). 
Particularly after the recognition of the patently inadequate nature of one of the 
competency evaluations (R. 70-72), and given the indications in the second evaluation 
quickly, becoming particularly reactive, irrational, and rigid in problem 
solving ability. 
Nillson and Porter report, page 12. Obviously, Mr. Ott's upcoming trial for his very life 
would by nature have been "confrontive or stressful," rendering him out of control, 
irrational, reactive and rigid in problem solving - in a word, incompetent. See, e ^ Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-2, supra. 
At trial, Ott's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Egli, testified concerning how people with 
Ott's illnesses may be delusional, out of control, unable to form intent, unable to act 
judiciously, unable to understand other people's intentions or the consequences or 
magnitude of their own behavior, and prone to feeling victimized and persecuted and 
reacting inappropriately (R2166:110-113). He testified that in the space of 6 months prior 
to trial, Ott was getting his emotions and ability to express them under control and his 
mood and medication stabilized, but that at the time of trial, his medication was still not 
fully evaluated (R. 1378 at 89-93). This testimony again pointed to Ott's incompetency. 
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that Ott was incompetent,31 the trial court should not have permitted trial counsel to 
withdraw the competency petition on the basis of the colloquy the trial court requested 
between trial counsel and Ott (R. 1366: 5). Mr. Ott, who had no independent training in 
that field, and who was obviously mentally ill, was in no position to assess his own 
competency. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86 (relying on the defendant's seemingly rational 
performance in court "offers no justification for ignoring the uncontradicted testimony of 
Robinson's history of pronounced irrational behavior. While Robinson's demeanor at trial 
might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to 
dispense with a hearing on that very issue."); Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 n.9 (interpreting 
Pate as requiring a competency evaluation, despite the defendant's behavior at trial and 
the opinion of a psychiatrist that he understood the charges and could consult with 
counsel two months before trial, in light of "history of pronounced irrational behavior"); 
31
 One of the evaluations which concluded that Ott was competent actually 
contained many assertions which point to incompetence. It stated: 
Mr. Ott's characteristics also make it difficult for him to participate 
consistently in a legal proceeding in representing himself. By traditional 
standards of assessment, he is competent to stand trial. However, given his 
obsessiveness, reactivity, volatility and paranoia, he is at significant risk to 
make poor judgments or act in contradiction to the required course of the 
proceedings. Depending upon the circumstance an the course and flow of 
events, he is likely to be able to perform under conditions that are not 
particularly confrontive or stressful but is likely to lose control relatively 
quickly, becoming particularly reactive, irrational, and rigid in problem 
solving ability. 
Nillson and Porter report, page 12. Obviously, Mr. Ott's upcoming trial for his very life 
would by nature have been "confrontive or stressful," rendering him out of control, 
irrational, reactive and rigid in problem solving - in a word, incompetent. See, e.g. Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-2, supra. 
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and Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992) ("'[I]t is contradictory to argue that a 
defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to 
have the court determine his capacity to stand trial[.]. . . [I]t is also contradictory to argue 
that a defendant who may be incompetent should be presumed to possess sufficient 
intelligence that he will be able to adduce evidence of his incompetency which might 
otherwise be within his grasp.") (quoting Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S., at 384). Even if Ott 
were properly called upon to opine on his own competency, counsel failed to address the 
proper statutory criteria or legal definitions in leading Ott to testify that he was 
competent. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-4, supra. 
Because there is a reasonable possibility that Ott pled and was tried while he was 
incompetent, this establishes prejudicial, and thus plain error. Cf. Williamson v. Ward, 
110 F.3d 1508, 1520 (10th Cir. 1997)(if there is a reasonable probability the defendant 
was tried while incompetent, this establishes prejudice for purposes of ineffective 
assistance analysis). See also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76. f 31 n. 14, 12 P.3d 92 
(recognizing that prejudice prong of plain error test requires same proof as prejudice 
prong of ineffective assistance test); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 n. 15 (Utah 
1989)(same). 
The use of anonymous jury procedures constitutes obvious error in this state, 
wherein all proceedings in serious criminal prosecutions have historically occurred in 
open court and on the record in part to make jurors feel accountable for their verdicts, 
see, e.g.. State v. Jordan, supra, and Constitution of Utah, Article VIII § 1, and where 
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calling jurors by name is required by the rule of criminal procedure governing jury 
selection. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(a)(1) and (2). The trial court's use of anonymous jury 
procedures without any cause or ameliorative measures would constitute plain error in 
virtually any jurisdiction permitting the use of anonymous juries. See, e.g.. Brown and 
Thomas, supra and cases and law review articles cited therein. The fact that Ott's jurors 
requested continuing anonymity after the trial expressly because they feared retaliation 
from Ott's family (R. 1379 at 8-10), confirms a reasonable likelihood that at least one of 
the ten jurors who voted for life without parole would have voted for a term of twenty to 
life had they not been treated as if they needed special protection from the outset of jury 
selection. 
Given the wealth of law from this Court on the issue of victim impact evidence, 
and the parallel federal law on that topic, see, e.g.. Carter. Kell and Payne, supra, the trial 
court should have recognized the errors involved in the highly prejudicial playing of the 
"Meet Lacey Lawrence" videotape, and the prosecution's repeated reliance on highly 
prejudicial and improper victim impact evidence. See id- The probable likelihood that 
one more of Ott's jurors would have voted for a sentence of twenty years to life instead of 
life without parole establishes the prejudice required for a finding of plain error. See 
Eldredge. While Judge Allphin surely should not be faulted for failing to anticipate the 
evidence before it was played and he had an opportunity to see it, his acquiescence to the 
stipulation to keep the "Meet Lacey Lawrence" videotape and other recordings which 
were played to the jury outside of the appellate record did not square with the obligation 
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of all courts of record to maintain a thorough record of the proceedings. See Olson v. 
Park-Craig-Olsen, Inc., supra. The highly prejudicial nature of the admission of the 
victim impact evidence would qualify Ott for relief under the plain error doctrine, despite 
the fact that the error was only obvious in hindsight after the evidence came in. See 
Eldredge, supra. 
Finally, the law demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the life without parole 
statute was all well-established at the time of trial. All members of the bar, including this 
trial court judge, took an oath to "obey, support and defend" the Utah Constitution upon 
joining the bar. See Ut. R. Prof. Conduct oath. The life without parole statute runs 
contrary to the plain language of plain language of Article VII § 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, which grants the Utah Board of Pardons the authority to "grant parole . . . in 
all cases except treason and impeachments[.]" Particularly a judicial branch actor would 
reasonably be expected to know that the Board of Pardons is viewed as a branch of 
government under Article V § 1, our separation of government powers provision, see 
Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons. 2004 UT 53, ffi[ 26-27, 94 P.3d 283 (recognizing the 
Board of Pardons as an Executive Branch "person" subject to Article V § 1), and should 
recognize that a statute which purports to limit the Board's constitutional authority by 
judicial order runs afoul of not just the plain language of Article VII § 12, but also the 
separation of powers provision. Any judge who reads the statute should be able to 
recognize the irrationality of the classifications in the statute, and to recognize that such 
irrational classifications do not pass muster under the uniform operation of laws 
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provision. E.g. State v. Mohi, supra. 
Particularly given the need for all criminal laws to give clear notice of criminal 
behavior and sentences, e.g., Grayned and Gallion, and the well-recognized need for 
careful legislative channeling of capital sentencers' discretion, e^*. State v. Carter, 888 
P.2d 629, 652 (Utah), cert denied, 516 U.S. 858 (1995), any judge faced with a statute 
calling upon jurors to send someone to prison for the remainder of his or her life on the 
basis of a finding of appropriateness should recognize the vagueness of the life without 
parole statute. 
In short, the statute is plainly unconstitutional and the trial court should have so 
recognized. Given that Ott could not be serving a sentence of life without parole had that 
statute properly been stricken, he has established prejudice of purposes of plain error 
analysis. 
This case is also appropriate for the application of the exceptional circumstances 
and cumulative error analyses, because the procedural anomalies which occurred resulted 
in substantial injustice, much of which cannot be quantified but is fairly assumed. 
See Nelson-Waggoner and Dunn, supra. The fact that Ott's lead trial lawyer was 
simultaneously acting as a lawyer for and co-counsel with the prosecutor in a separate 
case for the prosecutor's wife during Ott's capital prosecution would seem to constitute a 
rare procedural anomaly. Given the many instances in the record, discussed above, 
wherein lead counsel failed to investigate and prepare the case and protect and assert 
Ott's rights, wherein he discussed defense strategy with the prosecutor, wherein he 
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entered into two stipulations which served the prosecution's interests (to use Dr. Egli to 
testify in limited fashion and despite his lack of opportunity to prepare instead of moving 
to continue the trial, and to withhold the most appealable and other exhibits from the 
appellate record), the interests of justice and public confidence in our judicial system call 
for application of the exceptional circumstances doctrine in Ott's case. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Ott's convictions and sentences and remand this matter 
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with Ott's constitutional and statutory 
rights discussed above. 
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